## **EMV**Integrated Circuit Card Specifications for Payment Systems

## Book 3

## **Application Specification**

Version 4.3 November 2011

# **EMV**<sup>®\*</sup> Integrated Circuit Card Specifications for Payment Systems

## Book 3

## **Application Specification**

Version 4.3 November 2011

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#### **Revision Log - Version 4.3**

The following changes have been made to Book 3 since the publication of Version 4.2. Numbering and cross references in this version have been updated to reflect changes introduced by the published bulletins.

#### Incorporated changes described in the following Specification Updates:

Specification Update Bulletin no. 68: '61La' Response when using T=1

Specification Update Bulletin no. 69 Second Edition: Padding of BER-TLV Encoded Constructed Data Objects

Specification Update Bulletin no. 72: DDA support in terminals

#### Incorporated changes described in the following Specification Bulletins:

Specification Bulletin no. 78: Removal of DDF Entries from PSE Records

Specification Bulletin no. 79: Amount Requested in the PDOL

Specification Bulletin no. 82: Various Terminal Updates

Specification Bulletin no. 83: Incorrectly Formatted ICC Data Objects

Specification Bulletin no. 85: CVM Results after a CVM Failure

Specification Bulletin no. 87: Reserve AIP Bit for Contactless

Specification Bulletin no. 88: Application Selection Updates

Specification Bulletin no. 89: EMV Tag Allocations

Specification Bulletin no. 91: AES Support in Common Core Definitions

**Minor editorial clarifications**, including those described in the following Specification Bulletin:

Specification Bulletin no. 80: Editorial Errors in Version 4.2 of the EMV Specifications

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# Part I General

#### 1 Scope

This document, the *Integrated Circuit Card Specifications for Payment Systems - Book 3, Application Specification* defines the terminal and integrated circuit card (ICC) procedures necessary to effect a payment system transaction in an international interchange environment.

The *Integrated Circuit Card Specifications for Payment Systems* includes the following additional documents, all available on <a href="http://www.emvco.com">http://www.emvco.com</a>:

- Book 1 Application Independent ICC to Terminal Interface Requirements
- Book 2 Security and Key Management
- Book 4 Cardholder, Attendant, and Acquirer Interface Requirements

#### 1.1 Changes in Version 4.3

This release incorporates all relevant Specification Update Bulletins, Application Notes, amendments, etc. published up to the date of this release.

The Revision Log at the beginning of the Book provides additional detail about changes to this specification.

#### 1.2 Structure

Book 3 consists of the following parts:

Part I - General

Part II - Data Elements and Commands

Part III - Debit and Credit Application Specification

Part IV - Annexes

Part V - Common Core Definitions

Part I includes this introduction, as well as data applicable to all Books: normative references, definitions, abbreviations, notations, data element format convention, and terminology.

Part II describes data elements and files as well as commands for financial transaction.

Part III specifies the debit and credit application functions including:

- Transaction flow (the sequence of events and the commands issued to the card)
- Exception processing
- Definition of data elements and commands as they apply to the exchange of information between an ICC and a terminal. In particular,
  - Structure and referencing of files
  - The usage of commands between the ICC and the terminal to achieve application level functions.

The functions described are those necessary to ensure that payment system cards conforming to this specification can perform a set of core functions in terminals conforming to this specification. Application functions unique to individual payment systems and those functions not performed in interchange are not described, but are not precluded.

Part IV includes a complete data elements dictionary, rules for BER-TLV data objects, instructions for coding of specific data elements, and transaction log information. It discusses TVR and TSI bit settings following script processing, and Status Words returned in response to an EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.

Part V defines an optional extension to be used when implementing a card complying to the Common Core Definitions (CCD).

The Book also includes a revision log and an index.

This specification does not address clearing and settlement or any transactions where the ICC is not present.

#### 1.3 Underlying Standards

This specification is based on the ISO/IEC 7816 series of standards and should be read in conjunction with those standards. However, if any of the provisions or definitions in this specification differ from those standards, the provisions herein shall take precedence.

#### 1.4 Audience

This specification is intended for use by manufacturers of ICCs and terminals, system designers in payment systems, and financial institution staff responsible for implementing financial applications in ICCs.

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#### 2 Normative References

The following standards contain provisions that are referenced in these specifications. The latest version shall apply unless a publication date is explicitly stated.

ISO 639-1	Codes for the representation of names of languages – Part 1: Alpha-2 Code
	<b>Note:</b> This standard is updated continuously by ISO. Additions/changes to ISO 639-1:1988: Codes for the Representation of Names of Languages are available on:
	http://www.loc.gov/standards/iso639- 2/php/code_changes.php
ISO 3166	Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions
ISO 4217	Codes for the representation of currencies and funds
ISO/IEC 7811-1	Identification cards – Recording technique – Part 1: Embossing
ISO/IEC 7811-3	Identification cards – Recording technique – Part 3: Location of embossed characters on ID-1 cards
ISO/IEC 7813	$Identification\ cards-Financial\ transaction\ cards$
ISO/IEC 7816-1	Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts – Part 1: Physical characteristics
ISO/IEC 7816-2	Information technology – Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts – Part 2: Dimensions and location of contacts
ISO/IEC 7816-3	Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part 3: Cards with contacts — Electrical interface and transmission protocols

ISO/IEC 7816-4	Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange
ISO/IEC 7816-5	Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part 5: Registration of application providers
ISO/IEC 7816-6	Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards – Part 6: Interindustry data elements for interchange
ISO 8583:1987	Bank card originated messages – Interchange message specifications – Content for financial transactions
ISO 8583:1993	Financial transaction card originated messages – Interchange message specifications
ISO/IEC 8825-1	Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
ISO/IEC 8859	Information processing – 8-bit single-byte coded graphic character sets
ISO 9362	Banking – Banking telecommunication messages – Bank identifier codes
ISO 9564-1:2011	Financial services – Personal Identification Number (PIN) management and security – Part 1: Basic principles and requirements for PINs in card-based systems
ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010	Information technology – Security techniques – Digital signature schemes giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms
ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011	Information technology – Security techniques – Message Authentication Codes - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher
ISO/IEC 10116	Information technology – Security techniques – Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher
ISO/IEC 10118-3	Information technology – Security techniques – Hash-functions – Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions

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ISO/IEC 10373	$Identification\ cards-Test\ methods$
ISO 13491-1	Banking – Secure cryptographic devices (retail) – Part 1: Concepts, requirements and evaluation methods
ISO 13616	Banking and related financial services – International bank account number (IBAN)
ISO 16609	Banking – Requirements for message authentication using symmetric techniques
ISO/IEC 18031	Information technology - Security techniques - Random bit generation
ISO/IEC 18033-3	Information technology – Security techniques – Encryption algorithms – Part 3: Block ciphers

#### 3 Definitions

The following terms are used in one or more books of these specifications.

Accelerated Revocation

A key revocation performed on a date sooner than the

published key expiry date.

**Application** The application protocol between the card and the

terminal and its related set of data.

Application Authentication Cryptogram An Application Cryptogram generated by the card

when declining a transaction

Application Cryptogram

A cryptogram generated by the card in response to a GENERATE AC command. See also:

- Application Authentication Cryptogram
- Authorisation Request Cryptogram
- Transaction Certificate

Authorisation Request Cryptogram An Application Cryptogram generated by the card when requesting online authorisation

Authorisation Response Cryptogram A cryptogram generated by the issuer in response to an Authorisation Request Cryptogram.

Asymmetric Cryptographic Technique A cryptographic technique that uses two related transformations, a public transformation (defined by the public key) and a private transformation (defined by the private key). The two transformations have the property that, given the public transformation, it is computationally infeasible to derive the private

transformation.

**Authentication** The provision of assurance of the claimed identity of

an entity or of data origin.

**Block** A succession of characters comprising two or three

fields defined as prologue field, information field, and

epilogue field.

Byte 8 bits.

**Card** A payment card as defined by a payment system.

**Certificate** The public key and identity of an entity together with

some other information, rendered unforgeable by signing with the private key of the certification

authority which issued that certificate.

Certification Authority Trusted third party that establishes a proof that links a public key and other relevant information to its

owner.

**Ciphertext** Enciphered information.

Cold Reset The reset of the ICC that occurs when the supply

voltage (VCC) and other signals to the ICC are raised from the inactive state and the reset (RST) signal is

applied.

Combined DDA/Application Cryptogram Generation A form of offline dynamic data authentication.

**Command** A message sent by the terminal to the ICC that

initiates an action and solicits a response from the

ICC.

**Compromise** The breaching of secrecy or security.

**Concatenation** Two elements are concatenated by appending the

bytes from the second element to the end of the first. Bytes from each element are represented in the resulting string in the same sequence in which they were presented to the terminal by the ICC, that is, most significant byte first. Within each byte bits are ordered from most significant bit to least significant. A list of elements or objects may be concatenated by concatenating the first pair to form a new element, using that as the first element to concatenate with the

next in the list, and so on.

**Contact** A conducting element ensuring galvanic continuity

between integrated circuit(s) and external interfacing

equipment.

**Cryptogram** Result of a cryptographic operation.

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Cryptographic Algorithm

An algorithm that transforms data in order to hide or

reveal its information content.

**Data Integrity** 

The property that data has not been altered or

destroyed in an unauthorised manner.

Deactivation Sequence The deactivation sequence defined in section 6.1.5 of

Book 1.

**Decipherment** 

The reversal of a corresponding encipherment.

**Digital Signature** 

An asymmetric cryptographic transformation of data that allows the recipient of the data to prove the origin and integrity of the data, and protect the sender and the recipient of the data against forgery by third parties, and the sender against forgery by the

recipient.

Dynamic Data Authentication A form of offline dynamic data authentication

**Embossing** Characters raised in relief from the front surface of a

card.

**Encipherment** The reversible transformation of data by a

cryptographic algorithm to produce ciphertext.

**Epilogue Field** The final field of a block. It contains the error

detection code (EDC) byte(s).

**Exclusive-OR** Binary addition with no carry, giving the following

values:

0 + 0 = 0

0 + 1 = 1

1 + 0 = 1

1 + 1 = 0

Financial Transaction The act between a cardholder and a merchant or acquirer that results in the exchange of goods or

services against payment.

**Function** A process accomplished by one or more commands and

resultant actions that are used to perform all or part

of a transaction.

#### Guardtime

The minimum time between the trailing edge of the parity bit of a character and the leading edge of the start bit of the following character sent in the same direction.

#### **Hash Function**

A function that maps strings of bits to fixed-length strings of bits, satisfying the following two properties:

- It is computationally infeasible to find for a given output an input which maps to this output.
- It is computationally infeasible to find for a given input a second input that maps to the same output.

Additionally, if the hash function is required to be collision-resistant, it must also satisfy the following property:

• It is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs that map to the same output.

#### Hash Result

The string of bits that is the output of a hash function.

#### Inactive

The supply voltage (VCC) and other signals to the ICC are in the inactive state when they are at a potential of 0.4 V or less with respect to ground (GND).

## **Integrated Circuit Module**

The sub-assembly embedded into the ICC comprising the IC, the IC carrier, bonding wires, and contacts.

#### **Integrated Circuit(s)**

Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions.

## Integrated Circuit(s) Card

A card into which one or more integrated circuits are inserted to perform processing and memory functions.

#### **Interface Device**

That part of a terminal into which the ICC is inserted, including such mechanical and electrical devices as may be considered part of it.

#### **Issuer Action Code**

Any of the following, which reflect the issuer-selected action to be taken upon analysis of the TVR:

- Issuer Action Code Default
- Issuer Action Code Denial
- Issuer Action Code Online

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**Kernel** The set of functions required to be present on every

terminal implementing a specific interpreter. The kernel contains device drivers, interface routines, security and control functions, and the software for translating from the virtual machine language to the language used by the real machine. In other words, the kernel is the implementation of the virtual

machine on a specific real machine.

**Key** A sequence of symbols that controls the operation of a

cryptographic transformation.

**Key Expiry Date** The date after which a signature made with a

particular key is no longer valid. Issuer certificates signed by the key must expire on or before this date. Keys may be removed from terminals after this date

has passed.

**Key Introduction** The process of generating, distributing, and beginning

use of a key pair.

**Key Life Cycle** All phases of key management, from planning and

generation, through revocation, destruction, and

archiving.

**Key Replacement** The simultaneous revocation of a key and introduction

of a key to replaced the revoked one.

**Key Revocation** The key management process of withdrawing a key

from service and dealing with the legacy of its use. Key revocation can be as scheduled or accelerated.

Key Revocation Date The date after which no legitimate cards still in use

should contain certificates signed by this key, and therefore the date after which this key can be deleted from terminals. For a planned revocation the Key Revocation Date is the same as the key expiry date.

**Key Withdrawal** The process of removing a key from service as part of

its revocation.

**Keypad** Arrangement of numeric, command, and, where

required, function and/or alphanumeric keys laid out

in a specific manner.

Library A set of high-level software functions with a published

interface, providing general support for terminal

programs and/or applications.

Logical Compromise The compromise of a key through application of

> improved cryptanalytic techniques, increases in computing power, or combination of the two.

**Magnetic Stripe** The stripe containing magnetically encoded

information.

A string of bytes sent by the terminal to the card or Message

vice versa, excluding transmission-control characters.

A symmetric cryptographic transformation of data

Message

**Authentication Code** that protects the sender and the recipient of the data

against forgery by third parties.

**Nibble** The four most significant or least significant bits of a

byte.

**Padding** Appending extra bits to either side of a data string.

Path Concatenation of file identifiers without delimitation.

Payment System

A logical construct within the ICC, the entry point to **Environment** which is a Directory Definition File (DDF) named

'1PAY.SYS.DDF01'. This DDF contains a Payment System Directory which in turn contains entries for one or more Application Definition Files (ADFs) which

are formatted according to this specification.

Physical The compromise of a key resulting from the fact that Compromise

it has not been securely guarded, or a hardware security module has been stolen or accessed by

unauthorised persons.

PIN Pad Arrangement of numeric and command keys to be

used for personal identification number (PIN) entry.

**Plaintext** Unenciphered information.

**Planned Revocation** A key revocation performed as scheduled by the

published key expiry date.

Page 14 November 2011 Potential Compromise

A condition where cryptanalytic techniques and/or computing power has advanced to the point that compromise of a key of a certain length is feasible or even likely.

**Private Kev** 

That key of an entity's asymmetric key pair that should only be used by that entity. In the case of a digital signature scheme, the private key defines the signature function.

**Prologue Field** 

The first field of a block. It contains subfields for node address (NAD), protocol control byte (PCB), and length (LEN).

**Public Key** 

That key of an entity's asymmetric key pair that can be made public. In the case of a digital signature scheme, the public key defines the verification function.

Public Key Certificate The public key information of an entity signed by the certification authority and thereby rendered unforgeable.

Response

A message returned by the ICC to the terminal after the processing of a command message received by the ICC.

Script

A command or a string of commands transmitted by the issuer to the terminal for the purpose of being sent serially to the ICC as commands.

**Secret Key** 

A key used with symmetric cryptographic techniques and usable only by a set of specified entities.

Signal Amplitude

The difference between the high and low voltages of a signal.

Signal

**Perturbations** 

Abnormalities occurring on a signal during normal operation such as undershoot/overshoot, electrical noise, ripple, spikes, crosstalk, etc. Random perturbations introduced from external sources are beyond the scope of this specification.

Socket

An execution vector defined at a particular point in an application and assigned a unique number for reference.

State H Voltage high on a signal line. May indicate a logic one

or logic zero depending on the logic convention used

with the ICC.

State L Voltage low on a signal line. May indicate a logic one

or logic zero depending on the logic convention used

with the ICC.

Static Data Authentication Offline static data authentication

Symmetric Cryptographic Technique A cryptographic technique that uses the same secret key for both the originator's and recipient's

transformation. Without knowledge of the secret key, it is computationally infeasible to compute either the

originator's or the recipient's transformation.

T=0 Character-oriented asynchronous half duplex

transmission protocol.

T=1 Block-oriented asynchronous half duplex transmission

protocol.

**Template** Value field of a constructed data object, defined to give

a logical grouping of data objects.

**Terminal** The device used in conjunction with the ICC at the

point of transaction to perform a financial transaction. The terminal incorporates the interface device and may also include other components and interfaces

such as host communications.

Terminal Action Code

Any of the following, which reflect the acquirer-selected action to be taken upon analysis of the TVR:

- Terminal Action Code Default
- Terminal Action Code Denial
- Terminal Action Code Online

Terminate Card Session End the card session by deactivating the IFD contacts according to section 6.1.5 of Book 1, and displaying a message indicating that the ICC cannot be used to complete the transaction

complete the transaction

Terminate Transaction Stop the current application and deactivate the card.

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**Transaction** An action taken by a terminal at the user's request.

For a POS terminal, a transaction might be payment for goods, etc. A transaction selects among one or more applications as part of its processing flow.

Transaction Certificate An Application Cryptogram generated by the card

when accepting a transaction

Virtual Machine A theoretical microprocessor architecture that forms

the basis for writing application programs in a specific

interpreter software implementation.

Warm Reset The reset that occurs when the reset (RST) signal is

applied to the ICC while the clock (CLK) and supply voltage (VCC) lines are maintained in their active

state.

## 4 Abbreviations, Notations, Conventions, and Terminology

#### 4.1 Abbreviations

 $\mu A$  Microampere

 $\mu m \qquad \qquad Micrometre$ 

μs Microsecond

a Alphabetic (see section 4.3, Data Element Format Convention)

AAC Application Authentication Cryptogram

AC Application Cryptogram

ACK Acknowledgment

ADF Application Definition File

AEF Application Elementary File

AFL Application File Locator

AID Application Identifier

AIP Application Interchange Profile

an Alphanumeric (see section 4.3)

ans Alphanumeric Special (see section 4.3)

APDU Application Protocol Data Unit

API Application Program Interface

ARC Authorisation Response Code

ARPC Authorisation Response Cryptogram

ARQC Authorisation Request Cryptogram

ASI Application Selection Indicator

ASN Abstract Syntax Notation

ATC Application Transaction Counter

ATM Automated Teller Machine

ATR Answer to Reset

AUC Application Usage Control

b Binary (see section 4.3)

BCD Binary Coded Decimal

BER Basic Encoding Rules (defined in ISO/IEC 8825-1)

BIC Bank Identifier Code

BGT Block Guardtime

BWI Block Waiting Time Integer

BWT Block Waiting Time

C Celsius or Centigrade

CAD Card Accepting Device

C-APDU Command APDU

CBC Cipher Block Chaining

CCD Common Core Definitions

CCI Common Core Identifier

CDA Combined DDA/Application Cryptogram Generation

CDOL Card Risk Management Data Object List

CID Cryptogram Information Data

C<sub>IN</sub> Input Capacitance

CLA Class Byte of the Command Message

CLK Clock

cn Compressed Numeric (see section 4.3)

CPU Central Processing Unit

CRL Certificate Revocation List

CSU Card Status Update

C-TPDU Command TPDU

CV Cryptogram Version

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CVM Cardholder Verification Method

CVR Card Verification Results

CV Rule Cardholder Verification Rule

CWI Character Waiting Time Integer

CWT Character Waiting Time

D Bit Rate Adjustment Factor

DAD Destination Node Address

DC Direct Current

DDA Dynamic Data Authentication

DDF Directory Definition File

DDOL Dynamic Data Authentication Data Object List

DES Data Encryption Standard

DF Dedicated File

DIR Directory

DOL Data Object List

ECB Electronic Code Book

EDC Error Detection Code

EF Elementary File

EN European Norm

etu Elementary Time Unit

f Frequency

FC Format Code

FCI File Control Information

GND Ground

GP Grandparent key for session key generation

Hex Hexadecimal

HHMMSS Hours, Minutes, Seconds

I/O Input/Output

IAC Issuer Action Code (Denial, Default, Online)

IAD Issuer Application Data

IBAN International Bank Account Number

I-block Information BlockIC Integrated Circuit

ICC Integrated Circuit(s) Card

ICC Current drawn from VCC

IEC International Electrotechnical Commission

IFD Interface Device

IFS Information Field Size

IFSC Information Field Size for the ICC

IFSD Information Field Size for the Terminal

IFSI Information Field Size Integer

IIN Issuer Identification Number

IK Intermediate Key for session key generation

INF Information Field

INS Instruction Byte of Command Message

IOH High Level Output Current

Iol Low Level Output Current

ISO International Organization for Standardization

IV Initial Vector for session key generation

K<sub>M</sub> Master Key

K<sub>S</sub> Session Key

L Length

l.s. Least Significant

Lc Exact Length of Data Sent by the TAL in a Case 3 or 4

Command

LCOL Lower Consecutive Offline Limit

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L<sub>DD</sub> Length of the ICC Dynamic Data

Le Maximum Length of Data Expected by the TAL in Response to

a Case 2 or 4 Command

LEN Length

Licc Exact Length of Data Available or Remaining in the ICC (as

Determined by the ICC) to be Returned in Response to the

Case 2 or 4 Command Received by the ICC

Lr Length of Response Data Field

LRC Longitudinal Redundancy Check

M Mandatory

 $m\Omega$  Milliohm

 $M\Omega$  Megohm

m.s. Most Significant

m/s Meters per Second

mA Milliampere

MAC Message Authentication Code

max. Maximum

MF Master File

MHz Megahertz

min. Minimum

MK ICC Master Key for session key generation

mm Millimetre

MMDD Month, Day

MMYY Month, Year

N Newton

n Numeric (see section 4.3)

NAD Node Address

NAK Negative Acknowledgment

nAs Nanoampere-second

N<sub>CA</sub> Length of the Certification Authority Public Key Modulus

NF Norme Française

N<sub>I</sub> Length of the Issuer Public Key Modulus

N<sub>IC</sub> Length of the ICC Public Key Modulus

NIST National Institute for Standards and Technology

N<sub>PE</sub> Length of the ICC PIN Encipherment Public Key Modulus

ns Nanosecond

O Optional

O/S Operating System

P Parent key for session key generation

P1 Parameter 1

P2 Parameter 2

P3 Parameter 3

PAN Primary Account Number

PC Personal Computer

P<sub>CA</sub> Certification Authority Public Key

PCB Protocol Control Byte

PDOL Processing Options Data Object List

pF Picofarad

P<sub>I</sub> Issuer Public Key

P<sub>IC</sub> ICC Public Key

PIN Personal Identification Number

PIX Proprietary Application Identifier Extension

POS Point of Service

pos. Position

PSE Payment System Environment

PTS Protocol Type Selection

R-APDU Response APDU

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R-block Receive Ready Block

RFU Reserved for Future Use

RID Registered Application Provider Identifier

RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman Algorithm

RST Reset

SAD Source Node Address

S-block Supervisory Block

S<sub>CA</sub> Certification Authority Private Key

SDA Static Data Authentication

SFI Short File Identifier

SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm 1

S<sub>I</sub> Issuer Private Key

S<sub>IC</sub> ICC Private Key

SK Session Key for session key generation

SW1 Status Byte One

SW2 Status Byte Two

TAC Terminal Action Code(s) (Default, Denial, Online)

TAL Terminal Application Layer

TC Transaction Certificate

TCK Check Character

TDOL Transaction Certificate Data Object List

t<sub>F</sub> Fall Time Between 90% and 10% of Signal Amplitude

TLV Tag Length Value

TPDU Transport Protocol Data Unit

 $t_R$  Rise Time Between 10% and 90% of Signal Amplitude

TS Initial Character

TSI Transaction Status Information

TTL Terminal Transport Layer

TVR Terminal Verification Results

UCOL Upper Consecutive Offline Limit

UL Underwriters Laboratories Incorporated

V Volt

var. Variable (see section 4.3)

V<sub>CC</sub> Voltage Measured on VCC Contact

VCC Supply Voltage

V<sub>IH</sub> High Level Input Voltage

 $V_{IL}$  Low Level Input Voltage

V<sub>OH</sub> High Level Output Voltage

Vol. Low Level Output Voltage

VPP Programming Voltage

V<sub>PP</sub> Voltage Measured on VPP contact

WI Waiting Time Integer

WTX Waiting Time Extension

WWT Work Waiting Time

YYMM Year, Month

YYMMDD Year, Month, Day

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#### 4.2 Notations

'0' to '9' and 'A' to 'F' 16 hexadecimal characters

xx Any value

A := B A is assigned the value of B

A = B Value of A is equal to the value of B

 $A \equiv B \mod n$  Integers A and B are congruent modulo the integer n,

that is, there exists an integer d such that

(A - B) = dn

A mod n The reduction of the integer A modulo the integer n, that

is, the unique integer r,  $0 \le r < n$ , for which there exists

an integer d such that

A = dn + r

A / n The integer division of A by n, that is, the unique

integer d for which there exists an integer r,  $0 \le r < n$ ,

such that

A = dn + r

Y := ALG(K)[X] Encipherment of a data block X with a block cipher as

specified in Annex A1 of Book 2, using a secret key K

 $X = ALG^{-1}(K)[Y]$  Decipherment of a data block Y with a block cipher as

specified in Annex A1 of Book 2, using a secret key K

 $Y := Sign(S_K)[X]$  The signing of a data block X with an asymmetric

reversible algorithm as specified in Annex A2 of Book 2,

using the private key S<sub>K</sub>

 $X = Recover(P_K)[Y]$  The recovery of the data block X with an asymmetric

reversible algorithm as specified in Annex A2 of Book 2,

using the public key P<sub>K</sub>

 $C := (A \mid \mid B)$  The concatenation of an n-bit number A and an m-bit

number B, which is defined as  $C = 2^m A + B$ .

Leftmost Applies to a sequence of bits, bytes, or digits and used

interchangeably with the term "most significant". If  $C = (A \mid | B)$  as above, then A is the leftmost n bits of C.

Rightmost Applies to a sequence of bits, bytes, or digits and used

interchangeably with the term "least significant". If  $C = (A \mid \mid B)$  as above, then B is the rightmost m bits

of C.

H := Hash[MSG] Hashing of a message MSG of arbitrary length using a

160-bit hash function

 $X \oplus Y \hspace{1cm} \textbf{The symbol '} \oplus \textbf{'} \hspace{1cm} \textbf{denotes bit-wise exclusive-} OR \hspace{1cm} \textbf{and is}$ 

defined as follows:

 $X \oplus Y$  The bit-wise exclusive-OR of the data blocks X and Y. If one data block is shorter than the other, then it is first padded to the left with

sufficient binary zeros to make it the same

length as the other.

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#### 4.3 Data Element Format Conventions

The EMV specifications use the following data element formats:

- a Alphabetic data elements contain a single character per byte. The permitted characters are alphabetic only (a to z and A to Z, upper and lower case).
- an Alphanumeric data elements contain a single character per byte. The permitted characters are alphabetic (a to z and A to Z, upper and lower case) and numeric (0 to 9).
- Alphanumeric Special data elements contain a single character per byte. The permitted characters and their coding are shown in the Common Character Set table in Annex B of Book 4.
  - There is one exception: The permitted characters for Application Preferred Name are the non-control characters defined in the ISO/IEC 8859 part designated in the Issuer Code Table Index associated with the Application Preferred Name.
- b These data elements consist of either unsigned binary numbers or bit combinations that are defined elsewhere in the specification.
  - Binary example: The Application Transaction Counter (ATC) is defined as "b" with a length of two bytes. An ATC value of 19 is stored as Hex '00 13'.
  - Bit combination example: Processing Options Data Object List (PDOL) is defined as "b" with the format shown in section 5.4.
- cn Compressed numeric data elements consist of two numeric digits (having values in the range Hex '0'-'9') per byte. These data elements are left justified and padded with trailing hexadecimal 'F's.
  - Example: The Application Primary Account Number (PAN) is defined as "cn" with a length of up to ten bytes. A value of 1234567890123 may be stored in the Application PAN as Hex '12 34 56 78 90 12 3F FF' with a length of 8.
- Numeric data elements consist of two numeric digits (having values in the range Hex '0' '9') per byte. These digits are right justified and padded with leading hexadecimal zeroes. Other specifications sometimes refer to this data format as Binary Coded Decimal ("BCD") or unsigned packed.
  - Example: Amount, Authorised (Numeric) is defined as "n 12" with a length of six bytes. A value of 12345 is stored in Amount, Authorised (Numeric) as Hex '00 00 00 01 23 45'.

var. Variable data elements are variable length and may contain any bit combination. Additional information on the formats of specific variable data elements is available elsewhere.

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# 4.4 Terminology

proprietary Not defined in this specification and/or outside the scope

of this specification

shall Denotes a mandatory requirement

should Denotes a recommendation

# Part II Data Elements and

**Commands** 

## 5 Data Elements and Files

An application in the Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) includes a set of items of information. These items of information may be accessible to the terminal after a successful application selection (see section 12 of Book 1).

An item of information is called a data element. A data element is the smallest piece of information that may be identified by a name, a description of logical content, a format, and a coding.

# 5.1 Data Elements Associated with Financial Transaction Interchange

The data elements dictionary defined in Annex A includes those data elements that may be used for financial transaction interchange. Data elements not specified in Annex A are outside the scope of these specifications.

Any additional data element transmitted in the response to the SELECT command (for example, O/S Manufacturer proprietary data) is placed in the field "FCI Issuer Discretionary Data" (tag 'BF0C').

# 5.2 Data Objects

A data object consists of a tag, a length, and a value. A tag uniquely identifies a data object within the environment of an application. The length is the length of the value field of the data object. The value field of a data object may consist of either a single data element or one or more data objects. When a data object encapsulates a single data element, it is called a primitive data object. When a data object encapsulates one or more data objects, it is called a constructed data object. Specific tags are assigned to the constructed data objects with a specific meaning in the environment of an application according to this specification. The value field of such constructed data objects is a context-specific template. Rules for the coding of context-specific data objects and templates are given in Annex B.

Upon receipt, the terminal shall parse all the data elements following the rules described in Annex B. The retrieved value fields of the data elements shall be stored in the terminal buffer for possible later use in the application.

The terminal shall be capable of correctly interpreting Tag Length Value (TLV) data objects with a length field coded '00' as defined in ISO/IEC 7816. This situation can occur when a data element is personalised on a card without an actual value field. A data element with length '00' shall be treated as not present. The data element length indicated in Annex A reflects the length of the data elements when actually present on the card.

Annex A describes the mapping of data elements onto data objects and the mapping of data objects into templates when applicable.

Records are templates containing one or more primitive and/or constructed data objects.

The mapping of data objects into records is left to the discretion of the issuer. The manner in which data elements are to be used is described in Part III.

Annex B defines the tags that are reserved by this specification for EMVCo, the payment systems, and issuers. All ICC applications conforming to this specification shall comply with this coding and allocation scheme in accordance with ISO/IEC 7816-6.

# 5.2.1 Classes of Data Objects

Identification and coding of different classes of data objects are defined in Annex B. The tag definitions specified in that annex are according to ISO/IEC 8825 and the ISO/IEC 7816 series and apply to applications conforming to this specification.

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#### 5.3 Files

The data objects contained in data files accessible from the ICC are stored in records. The file structure and referencing method depend on the purpose of the file. The following sections describe structures and referencing methods. The layout of the data files accessible from the ICC is left to the discretion of the issuer except for the directory files described in the following section.

## 5.3.1 Application Elementary Files

An Application Elementary File (AEF) in the range 1-10, contains one or more primitive Basic Encoding Rules - TLV (BER-TLV) data objects grouped into constructed BER-TLV data objects (records) according to Annex B. After selecting the application, an AEF in the range 1-10 is referred to only by its SFI as described in section 5.3.2.2.

A data file referred to in this specification consists of a sequence of records addressed by record number. The data files referred to by SFIs in the range 1-10 contain only data not interpreted by the card, that is, data that is not used by the card in its internal processes. This file structure is defined as linear. It can be either linear fixed or linear variable according to ISO/IEC 7816-4. The choice is left to the issuer and does not affect the reading of the file according to this specification.

#### 5.3.2 File Referencing

A file may be referred to by a name or a SFI depending on its type.

#### 5.3.2.1 Referencing by Name

Any Application Definition File (ADF) or Directory Definition File (DDF) in the card is referenced by its Dedicated File (DF) name. A DF name for an ADF corresponds to the Application Identifier (AID) or contains the AID as the beginning of the DF name. Each DF name shall be unique within a given card.

#### 5.3.2.2 Referencing by SFI

SFIs are used for the selection of AEFs. Any AEF within a given application is referenced by a SFI coded on 5 bits in the range 1 to 30. The coding of the SFI is described in every command that uses it.

Table 1 describes the assignment of SFIs for an EMV application:

Value	Meaning
1-10	Governed by this specification
11-20	Payment system-specific
21-30	Issuer-specific

Table 1: Structure of SFI

A SFI shall be unique within an application. The coding of SFIs within the range 1 to 10 is used to address AEFs governed by this specification.

# 5.4 Rules for Using a Data Object List (DOL)

In several instances, the terminal is asked to build a flexible list of data elements to be passed to the card under the card's direction. To minimise processing within the ICC, such a list is not TLV encoded but is a single constructed field built by concatenating several data elements together. Since the elements of the constructed field are not TLV encoded, it is imperative that the ICC knows the format of this field when the data is received. This is achieved by including a Data Object List (DOL) in the ICC, specifying the format of the data to be included in the constructed field. DOLs currently used in this specification include:

- the Processing Options Data Object List (PDOL) used with the GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command
- the Card Risk Management Data Object Lists (CDOL1 and CDOL2) used with the GENERATE APPLICATION CRYPTOGRAM (AC) command
- the Transaction Certificate Data Object List (TDOL) used to generate a TC Hash Value
- the Dynamic Data Authentication Data Object List (DDOL) used with the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command

This section describes the rules for constructing a field using a DOL supplied by the card.

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A DOL is a concatenated list of entries, with each entry representing a single data element to be included in the constructed field. The format of each entry is a one- or two-byte tag identifying the desired data object, followed by a one-byte length which represents the number of bytes the field shall occupy in the command data. Only tags representing primitive data objects constructed according to Annex B shall be used in DOLs.

The terminal shall complete the following steps to build the constructed field:

- 1. Read the DOL from the ICC.
- 2. Concatenate all data elements listed in the DOL. The following rules apply to this concatenation:
  - a. If the tag of any data object identified in the DOL is unknown to the terminal or represents a constructed data object, the terminal shall provide a data element with the length specified and a value of all hexadecimal zeroes.
  - b. If a data object is in the list and is meaningful to the terminal but represents optional static data that is absent from the terminal, the portion of the command field representing the data object shall be filled with hexadecimal zeroes.
  - c. If the length specified in the DOL entry is less than the length of the actual data object, the leftmost bytes of the data element shall be truncated if the data object has numeric (n ¹) format, or the rightmost bytes of the data shall be truncated for any other format.
  - d. If the length specified in the DOL entry is greater than the length of the actual data, the actual data shall be padded:
    - with leading hexadecimal zeroes if the data has numeric format
    - with trailing hexadecimal 'FF's if the data has compressed numeric (cn ¹) format
    - with trailing hexadecimal zeroes for any other format (an, ans or b including bit combination data 1)
  - e. If a data object is in the list and is meaningful to the terminal but represents data that is not applicable to the current transaction, the portion of the command field representing the data object shall be filled with hexadecimal zeroes.

The completed list of data elements shall be concatenated in the sequence in which the corresponding data objects appear in the DOL.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See section 4.3 Data Element Format Convention.

## 6 Commands for Financial Transaction

#### 6.1 Command APDU Format

The command Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) consists of a mandatory header of four bytes followed by a conditional body of variable length, as shown in Figure 1:




Figure 1: Command APDU Structure

The number of data bytes sent in the command APDU (C-APDU) is denoted by Lc (length of command data field).

The maximum number of data bytes expected in the response APDU is denoted by length of expected data (Le). When Le is present and contains the value zero, the maximum number of available data bytes (up to 256) is expected. When required in a command message, Le shall always be set to '00'.

# 6.2 Response APDU Format

The response APDU format consists of a conditional body of variable length followed by a mandatory trailer of two bytes, as shown in Figure 2:



Figure 2: Response APDU Structure

The data field of a response APDU is an object structured as defined in Annex B. The detailed coding of the objects is provided with the commands described in subsequent sub-clauses.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> CLA = Class Byte of the Command Message

INS = Instruction Byte of Command Message

P1 = Parameter 1

P2 = Parameter 2

# 6.3 Coding Conventions

This section defines the coding of the header and the body of the messages (command and response).

# 6.3.1 Coding of the Class Byte

The most significant nibble of the class byte indicates the type of command as shown in Table 2:

Hex	Meaning
'0'	Inter-industry command
'8'	Proprietary to this specification
Any other value	Outside the scope of this specification

**Table 2: Most Significant Nibble of the Class Byte** 

A command proprietary to this specification is introduced by the most significant nibble of the class byte set to 8; in other words, the structure of the command and response messages is according to ISO/IEC 7816-4, and the coding of the messages is defined within the context of these specifications.

The least significant nibble of the class byte indicates secure messaging and logical channel mechanisms, according to ISO/IEC 7816-4.

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# 6.3.2 Coding of the Instruction Byte

The INS byte of a command is structured according to Book 1 section 9.4.1. Table 3 indicates the coding of INS and its relationship to CLA:

CLA	INS	Meaning
'8x'	'1E'	APPLICATION BLOCK
'8x'	'18'	APPLICATION UNBLOCK
'8x'	'16'	CARD BLOCK
'0x'	'82'	EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
'8x'	'AE'	GENERATE APPLICATION CRYPTOGRAM
'0x'	'84'	GET CHALLENGE
'8x'	'CA'	GET DATA
'8x'	'A8'	GET PROCESSING OPTIONS
'0x'	'88'	INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
'8x'	'24'	PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (PIN) CHANGE/UNBLOCK
'0x'	'B2'	READ RECORD
'0x'	'A4'	SELECT
'0x'	'20'	VERIFY
'8x'	'Dx'	RFU for the payment systems
'8x'	'Ex'	RFU for the payment systems
'9x'	'xx'	RFU for manufacturers for proprietary INS coding
'Ex'	'xx'	RFU for issuers for proprietary INS coding

**Table 3: Coding of the Instruction Byte** 

**Note:** Additional INS codes may be assigned in the future by EMVCo using class '8x'. It is strongly recommended that application providers not define proprietary commands in class '8x' when they are to be used in the context of these specifications, so that collision is avoided.

# 6.3.3 Coding of Parameter Bytes

The parameter bytes P1 P2 may have any value. If not used, a parameter byte has the value '00'.

# 6.3.4 Coding of Data Field Bytes

When present, a command APDU message data field consists of a string of data elements.

When present, a response APDU message data field consists of a data object or a string of data objects encapsulated in a template according to Annex B.

## 6.3.5 Coding of the Status Bytes

The status bytes SW1 SW2 are returned by the transport layer to the application layer in any response message and denote the processing state of the command. The coding of the status words is structured as illustrated in Figure 3:




Figure 3: Structural Scheme of Status Bytes

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SW1	SW2	Meaning
		Normal processing
'90'	'00'	Process completed (any other value for SW2 is RFU)
		Warning processing
'62'	'83'	State of non-volatile memory unchanged; selected file invalidated
'63'	'00'	State of non-volatile memory changed; authentication failed
'63'	'Cx'	State of non-volatile memory changed; counter provided by 'x' (from 0-15)
		Checking errors
'69'	'83'	Command not allowed; authentication method blocked
'69'	'84'	Command not allowed; referenced data invalidated
'69'	'85'	Command not allowed; conditions of use not satisfied
'6A'	'81'	Wrong parameter(s) P1 P2; function not supported
'6A'	'82'	Wrong parameter(s) P1 P2; file not found
'6A'	'83'	Wrong parameter(s) P1 P2; record not found
'6A'	'88'	Referenced data (data objects) not found

Table 4: Coding of Status Bytes SW1 SW2

The following values of SW1 SW2 are described in Part II of Book 1 as they apply to the Transport Protocol Data Unit (TPDU) and are not returned to the APDU:

- '61xx': SW2 indicates the number of response bytes still available.
- '6Cxx': Wrong length Le, SW2 indicates the exact length.

SW1 = '6x' or '90' denotes a normal, warning, or error condition coded according to ISO/IEC 7816-4.

Other values of SW1 returned by the ICC are not supported by Book 1, Part II.

Table 5 shows the coding of the SW1 SW2 status bytes which this specification requires to be returned in response to specific conditions. The card may generate status bytes not listed in this table for error and warning conditions not specified in Part III.

SW1	SW2	APPLICATION BLOCK	APPLICATION UNBLOCK	CARD BLOCK	EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE	GENERATE APPLICATION CRYPTOGRAM	GET CHALLENGE	GET DATA	GET PROCESSING OPTIONS	INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE	PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK	READ RECORD	SELECT	VERIFY
'62'	'83'												Х	
'63'	'00'				Х									
'63'	'Cx'													X
'69'	'83'													X
'69'	'84'													X
'69'	'85'				X	Х			X					
'6A'	'81'							Х					X	
'6A'	'82'												X	
'6A'	'83'											X		
'6A'	'88'							X						

**Table 5: Allocation of Status Bytes** 

The following convention is used in the table:

**X** = Allowed response code, for which a dedicated action shall be taken or which has a special meaning for an EMV compliant application. The meaning of the action is explained in section 10.

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If during transaction processing as described in Part III, the card returns a value for SW1 SW2 other than those specified in Table 5, and no other action is indicated elsewhere in these specifications, the transaction shall be terminated. For example, if the application reads records in a file that contains four records and, in response to the READ RECORD command for record 5, the card returns SW1 SW2 = '6400' instead of SW1 SW2 = '6A83', then the transaction would be terminated.

If during the processing of the GET DATA command, defined in section 6.5.7, the card returns an error condition, the terminal shall proceed as indicated in section 10.6.3 (for terminal velocity checking) or in section 6.3.4.1 of Book 4 (for cardholder verification processing).

If during the processing of an issuer script command, as defined in section 10.10, the card returns a warning condition (SW1 SW2 = '62XX' or '63xx'), the terminal shall continue with the next command from the Issuer Script (if any).

For the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command, SW1 SW2 = '6300' means 'Authentication Failed'.

#### 6.3.6 Coding of RFU Data

The coding of data (bits and bytes) indicated as RFU and marked as 'x' in the tables of the specifications shall be set to zero unless otherwise stated.

To allow for migration and support of new functionality, the ICC and the terminal shall not verify the data indicated as RFU.

# 6.4 Logical Channels

A logical channel establishes and maintains the link between an application in the terminal and an application in the card.

A card may support more than one logical channel but only the basic logical channel is supported by this specification. This limits to one the number of concurrent applications according to this specification.

# 6.5 Commands

This section describes the following APDU command-response pairs:

- APPLICATION BLOCK (post-issuance command)
- APPLICATION UNBLOCK (post-issuance command)
- CARD BLOCK (post-issuance command)
- EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
- GENERATE APPLICATION CRYPTOGRAM
- GET CHALLENGE
- GET DATA
- GET PROCESSING OPTIONS
- INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
- PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK (post-issuance command)
- READ RECORD
- VERIFY

The post-issuance commands shall only be sent using script processing (see section 10.10) and secure messaging as specified in Book 2.

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#### 6.5.1 APPLICATION BLOCK Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.1.1 Definition and Scope

The APPLICATION BLOCK command is a post-issuance command that invalidates the currently selected application.

Following the successful completion of an APPLICATION BLOCK command:

- An invalidated application shall return the status bytes SW1 SW2 = '6283' ('Selected file invalidated') in response to a SELECT command.
- An invalidated application shall return only an Application Authentication Cryptogram (AAC) as AC in response to a GENERATE AC command.

#### 6.5.1.2 Command Message

The APPLICATION BLOCK command message is coded as shown in Table 6:

Code	Value
CLA	'8C' or '84'; coding according to the secure messaging specified in Book 2
INS	'1E'
P1	'00'; all other values are RFU
P2	'00'; all other values are RFU
Lc	Number of data bytes
Data	Message Authentication Code (MAC) data component; coding according to the secure messaging specified in Book 2
Le	Not present

**Table 6: APPLICATION BLOCK Command Message** 

#### 6.5.1.3 Data Field Sent in the Command Message

The data field of the command message contains the MAC data component coded according to the secure messaging format specified in Book 2.

#### 6.5.1.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message

No data field is returned in the response message.

#### 6.5.1.5 Processing State Returned in the Response Message

'9000' indicates a successful execution of the command, whether the application was already invalidated or not.

# 6.5.2 APPLICATION UNBLOCK Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.2.1 Definition and Scope

The APPLICATION UNBLOCK command is a post-issuance command that rehabilitates the currently selected application.

Following the successful completion of an APPLICATION UNBLOCK command, the restrictions imposed by the APPLICATION BLOCK command are removed.

#### 6.5.2.2 Command Message

The APPLICATION UNBLOCK command message is coded as shown in Table 7.

Code	Value
CLA	'8C' or '84'; coding according to the secure messaging specified in Book 2
INS	'18'
P1	'00'; all other values are RFU
P2	'00'; all other values are RFU
Lc	Number of data bytes
Data	MAC data component; coding according to the secure messaging specified in Book 2
Le	Not present

**Table 7: APPLICATION UNBLOCK Command Message** 

#### 6.5.2.3 Data Field Sent in the Command Message

The data field of the command message contains the MAC data component coded according to the secure messaging format specified in Book 2.

#### 6.5.2.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message

No data field is returned in the response message.

#### 6.5.2.5 Processing State Returned in the Response Message

'9000' indicates a successful execution of the command, whether the application was previously invalidated or not.

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#### 6.5.3 CARD BLOCK Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.3.1 Definition and Scope

The CARD BLOCK command is a post-issuance command that permanently disables all applications in the ICC.

The CARD BLOCK command shall disable all applications in the ICC, including applications that may be selected implicitly.

Following the successful completion of a CARD BLOCK command, all subsequent SELECT commands shall return the status bytes SW1 SW2 = '6A81' ('Function not supported') and perform no other action.

#### 6.5.3.2 Command Message

The CARD BLOCK command message is coded as shown in Table 8.

Code	Value
CLA	'8C' or '84'; coding according to the secure messaging specified in Book 2
INS	'16'
P1	'00'; all other values are RFU
P2	'00'; all other values are RFU
Lc	Number of data bytes
Data	MAC data component; coding according to the secure messaging specified in Book 2
Le	Not present

**Table 8: CARD BLOCK Command Message** 

#### 6.5.3.3 Data Field Sent in the Command Message

The data field of the command message contains the MAC data component coded according to the secure messaging format specified in Book 2.

#### 6.5.3.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message

No data field is returned in the response message.

#### 6.5.3.5 Processing State Returned in the Response Message

'9000' indicates a successful execution of the command, whether the card was already blocked or not.

# 6.5.4 EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.4.1 Definition and Scope

The EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command asks the application in the ICC to verify a cryptogram.

The ICC returns the processing state of the command.

#### 6.5.4.2 Command Message

The EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command message is coded as shown in Table 9:

Code	Value
CLA	'00'
INS	'82'
P1	'00'
P2	'00'
Lc	8-16
Data	Issuer Authentication Data
Le	Not present

**Table 9: EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command Message** 

The reference of the algorithm (P1) of the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command is coded '00', which means that no information is given. The reference of the algorithm either is known before issuing the command or is provided in the data field.

#### 6.5.4.3 Data Field Sent in the Command Message

The data field of the command message contains the value field of tag '91' coded as follows:

- mandatory first 8 bytes containing the cryptogram
- optional additional 1-8 bytes are proprietary

#### 6.5.4.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message

No data field is returned in the response message.

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# 6.5.4.5 Processing State Returned in the Response Message

'9000' indicates a successful execution of the command.

'6300' indicates 'Issuer authentication failed'.

For further information, see Annex F.

# 6.5.5 GENERATE APPLICATION CRYPTOGRAM Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.5.1 Definition and Scope

The GENERATE AC command sends transaction-related data to the ICC, which computes and returns a cryptogram. This cryptogram shall either be an Application Cryptogram (AC) as specified in this specification or a proprietary cryptogram. In both cases, the cryptogram shall be of a type specified in Table 10 (for more details, see section 9).

This command is also used when performing the Combined DDA/Application Cryptogram Generation (CDA) function as described in Book 2 section 6.6.

Туре	Abbreviation	Meaning
Application Authentication Cryptogram	AAC	Transaction declined
Authorisation Request Cryptogram	ARQC	Online authorisation requested
Transaction Certificate	TC	Transaction approved

**Table 10: GENERATE AC Cryptogram Types** 

The cryptogram returned by the ICC may differ from that requested in the command message according to an internal process in the ICC (as described in section 9).

#### 6.5.5.2 Command Message

The GENERATE AC command message is coded as shown in Table 11:

Code	Value					
CLA	'80'					
INS	'AE'					
P1	Reference control parameter (see Table 12)					
P2	'00'					
Lc	Var.					
Data	Transaction-related data					
Le	'00'					

**Table 11: GENERATE AC Command Message** 

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The reference control parameter of the GENERATE AC command is coded as shown in Table 12:

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
0	0							AAC
0	1							TC
1	0							ARQC
1	1							RFU
		Х						RFU
			0					CDA signature not requested
			1					CDA signature requested
				Х	Х	Х	Х	RFU

Table 12: GENERATE AC Reference Control Parameter

#### 6.5.5.3 Data Field Sent in the Command Message

The content of the data field of the command message is coded according to the rules for the data object list as defined in section 5.4.

#### 6.5.5.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message

The data field of the response message consists of a BER-TLV coded data object. The coding of the data object shall be according to one of the following two formats.

• **Format 1:** The data object returned in the response message is a primitive data object with tag equal to '80'. The value field consists of the concatenation without delimiters (tag and length) of the value fields of the data objects specified in Table 13:

Value	Presence
Cryptogram Information Data (CID)	M
Application Transaction Counter (ATC)	M
Application Cryptogram (AC)	M
Issuer Application Data (IAD)	0

Table 13: Format 1 GENERATE AC Response Message Data Field

• Format 2: The data object returned in the response message is a constructed data object with tag equal to '77'. The value field may contain several BER-TLV coded objects, but shall always include the Cryptogram Information Data, the Application Transaction Counter, and the cryptogram computed by the ICC (either an AC or a proprietary cryptogram). The utilisation and interpretation of proprietary data objects which may be included in this response message are outside the scope of these specifications.

Format 2 shall be used if the response is being returned in a signature as specified for the CDA function described in section 6.6 of Book 2. The required data elements for the response are shown in the appropriate tables in that section.

For both formats, the Cryptogram Information Data returned by the GENERATE AC response message is coded as shown in Table 14:

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
0	0							AAC
0	1							TC
1	0							ARQC
1	1							RFU
		х	х					Payment System-specific cryptogram
				0				No advice required
				1				Advice required
					Х	х	х	Reason/advice code
					0	0	0	No information given
					0	0	1	Service not allowed
					0	1	0	PIN Try Limit exceeded
					0	1	1	Issuer authentication failed
					1	Х	Х	Other values RFU

**Table 14: Coding of Cryptogram Information Data** 

For the Format 2 response template, if any mandatory data element is missing, the terminal shall terminate the transaction.

#### 6.5.5.5 Processing State Returned in the Response Message

'9000' indicates a successful execution of the command.

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#### 6.5.6 GET CHALLENGE Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.6.1 Definition and Scope

The GET CHALLENGE command is used to obtain an unpredictable number from the ICC for use in a security-related procedure.

The challenge shall be valid only for the next issued command.

#### 6.5.6.2 Command Message

The GET CHALLENGE command message is coded as shown in Table 15:

Code	Value
CLA	'00'
INS	'84'
P1	'00'
P2	'00'
Lc	Not present
Data	Not present
Le	'00'

**Table 15: GET CHALLENGE Command Message** 

#### 6.5.6.3 Data Field Sent in the Command Message

The data field of the command message is not present.

#### 6.5.6.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message

The data field of the response message contains an 8-byte unpredictable number generated by the ICC.

#### 6.5.6.5 Processing State Returned in the Response Message

'9000' indicates a successful execution of the command.

#### 6.5.7 GET DATA Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.7.1 Definition and Scope

The GET DATA command is used to retrieve a primitive data object not encapsulated in a record within the current application.

The usage of the GET DATA command in this specification is limited to the retrieval of the following primitive data objects that are defined in Annex A and interpreted by the application in the ICC:

- ATC (tag '9F36')
- Last Online ATC Register (tag '9F13')
- PIN Try Counter (tag '9F17')
- Log Format (tag '9F4F')

#### 6.5.7.2 Command Message

The GET DATA command message is coded as shown in Table 16:

Code	Value
CLA	'80'
INS	'CA'
P1 P2	'9F36', '9F13', '9F17', or '9F4F'
Lc	Not present
Data	Not present
Le	'00'

**Table 16: GET DATA Command Message** 

#### 6.5.7.3 Data Field Sent in the Command Message

The data field of the command message is not present.

#### 6.5.7.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message

The data field of the response message contains the primitive data object referred to in P1 P2 of the command message (in other words, including its tag and its length).

#### 6.5.7.5 Processing State Returned in the Response Message

'9000' indicates a successful execution of the command.

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# 6.5.8 GET PROCESSING OPTIONS Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.8.1 Definition and Scope

The GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command initiates the transaction within the ICC.

The ICC returns the Application Interchange Profile (AIP) and the Application File Locator (AFL).

#### 6.5.8.2 Command Message

The GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command message is coded as shown in Table 17:

Code	Value
CLA	'80'
INS	'A8'
P1	'00'; all other values are RFU
P2	'00'; all other values are RFU
Lc	var.
Data	Processing Options Data Object List (PDOL) related data
Le	'00'

**Table 17: GET PROCESSING OPTIONS Command Message** 

#### 6.5.8.3 Data Field Sent in the Command Message

The data field of the command message is a data object coded according to the PDOL provided by the ICC, as defined in section 5.4, and is introduced by the tag '83'. When the data object list is not provided by the ICC, the terminal sets the length field of the template to zero. Otherwise, the length field of the template is the total length of the value fields of the data objects transmitted to the ICC.

#### 6.5.8.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message

The data field of the response message consists of a BER-TLV coded data object. The coding of the data object shall be according to one of the following two formats.

• **Format 1:** The data object returned in the response message is a primitive data object with tag equal to '80'. The value field consists of the concatenation without delimiters (tag and length) of the value fields of the AIP and the AFL. The coding of the data object returned in the response message is shown in Figure 4:

'80'	Length	Application Interchange	Application File
		Profile	Locator

Figure 4: Format 1 GET PROCESSING OPTIONS Response Message Data Field

• Format 2: The data object returned in the response message is a constructed data object with tag equal to '77'. The value field may contain several BERTLV coded objects, but shall always include the AIP and the AFL. The utilisation and interpretation of proprietary data objects which may be included in this response message are outside the scope of these specifications.

The AIP specifies the application functions that are supported by the application in the ICC and is coded according to Part III.

The AFL consists of the list, without delimiters, of files and related records for the currently selected application that shall be read according to section 10.2.

For the Format 2 response template, if any mandatory data element is missing, the terminal shall terminate the transaction.

#### 6.5.8.5 Processing State Returned in the Response Message

'9000' indicates a successful execution of the command.

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# 6.5.9 INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.9.1 Definition and Scope

The INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command initiates the computation of the Signed Dynamic Application Data by the card using:

- the challenge data sent from the terminal and
- ICC data and
- a relevant private key stored in the card.

The ICC returns the Signed Dynamic Application Data to the terminal.

#### 6.5.9.2 Command Message

The INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command message is coded as shown in Table 18:

Code	Value
CLA	'00'
INS	'88'
P1	'00'
P2	'00'
Lc	Length of authentication-related data
Data	Authentication-related data
Le	'00'

**Table 18: INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command Message** 

The reference of the algorithm (P1) of the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command is coded '00', which means that no information is given. The reference of the algorithm either is known before issuing the command or is provided in the data field.

#### 6.5.9.3 Data Field Sent in the Command Message

The data field of the command message contains the authentication-related data proprietary to an application. It is coded according to the DDOL as defined in Book 2.

#### 6.5.9.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message

The data field of the response message consists of a BER-TLV coded data object. The coding of the data object shall be according to one of the following two formats.

- **Format 1:** The data object returned in the response message is a primitive data object with tag equal to '80'. The value field consists of the value field of the Signed Dynamic Application Data as specified in Book 2.
- Format 2: The data object returned in the response message is a constructed data object with tag equal to '77'. The value field may contain several BERTLV coded objects, but shall always include the Signed Dynamic Application Data as specified in Book 2. The utilisation and interpretation of proprietary data objects which may be included in this response message are outside the scope of these specifications.

For the Format 2 response template, if any mandatory data element is missing, the terminal shall terminate the transaction.

**Note**: To ensure that the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE response data length is within the 256 byte limit, the length of the Signed Dynamic Application Data plus the length of the TLV encoded optional data (if present) shall remain within the limits as specified in Book 2 Annex D.

#### 6.5.9.5 Processing State Returned in the Response Message

'9000' indicates a successful execution of the command.

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#### 6.5.10 PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.10.1 Definition and Scope

The PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK command is a post-issuance command. Its purpose is to provide the issuer the capability either to unblock the PIN or to simultaneously change and unblock the reference PIN.

Upon successful completion of the PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK command, the card shall perform the following functions:

- The value of the PIN Try Counter shall be reset to the value of the PIN Try Limit.
- If requested, the value of the reference PIN shall be set to the new PIN value.

If PIN data is transmitted in the command it shall be enciphered for confidentiality.

**Note**: The reference PIN, which is stored within the card, is the one that is associated with the application and which the card uses to check the Transaction PIN Data transmitted within the VERIFY command.

#### 6.5.10.2 Command Message

The PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK command message is coded as shown in Table 19.

Code	Value
CLA	'8C' or '84'; coding according to the secure messaging specified in Book 2
INS	'24'
P1	'00'
P2	'00', '01', or '02'
Lc	Number of data bytes
Data	Enciphered PIN data component, if present, and MAC data component; coding according to the secure messaging specified in Book 2
Le	Not present

**Table 19: PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK Command Message** 

P2: If P2 is equal to '00', the reference PIN is unblocked and the PIN Try Counter is reset to the PIN Try Limit. There is no PIN update, since the PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK command does not contain a new PIN value.

The usage of P2 equal to '01' or '02' is reserved for payment systems.

Any other value of P2 allowing PIN unblocking and/or PIN changing is out of the scope of this specification and shall be described for each payment system individually.

#### 6.5.10.3 Data Field Sent in the Command Message

The data field of the command message contains the PIN data component, if present, followed by the MAC data component coded according to the secure messaging format specified in Book 2.

#### 6.5.10.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message

No data field is returned in the response message.

#### 6.5.10.5 Processing State Returned in the Response Message

'9000' indicates a successful execution of the command.

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## 6.5.11 READ RECORD Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.11.1 Definition and Scope

The READ RECORD command reads a file record in a linear file.

The response from the ICC consists of returning the record.

#### 6.5.11.2 Command Message

The READ RECORD command message is coded as shown in Table 20:

Code	Value
CLA	'00'
INS	'B2'
P1	Record number
P2	Reference control parameter (see Table 21)
Lc	Not present
Data	Not present
Le	'00'

Table 20: READ RECORD Command Message

Table 21 defines the reference control parameter of the command message:

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b3 b2 b1 Meaning			
Х	Х	Х	Х	Х				SFI	
					1	0	0	P1 is a record number	

Table 21: READ RECORD Command Reference Control Parameter

#### 6.5.11.3 Data Field Sent in the Command Message

The data field of the command message is not present.

#### 6.5.11.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message

The data field of the response message of any successful READ RECORD command contains the record read. For SFIs in the range 1-10, the record is a BER-TLV constructed data object as defined in Annex B and coded as shown in Figure 5:



Figure 5: READ RECORD Response Message Data Field

The response message to READ RECORD for SFIs in the range 11-30 is outside the scope of this specification, except as specified in section 10.3 and in Annex D.

#### 6.5.11.5 Processing State Returned in the Response Message

'9000' indicates a successful execution of the command.

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### 6.5.12 VERIFY Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.12.1 Definition and Scope

The VERIFY command initiates in the ICC the comparison of the Transaction PIN Data sent in the data field of the command with the reference PIN data associated with the application. The manner in which the comparison is performed is proprietary to the application in the ICC.

The VERIFY command applies when the Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) chosen from the CVM List is an offline PIN, as described in section 10.5.

#### 6.5.12.2 Command Message

The VERIFY command message is coded as shown in Table 22:

Code	Value
CLA	'00'
INS	'20'
P1	'00'
P2	Qualifier of the reference data (see Table 23)
Lc	Var.
Data	Transaction PIN Data
Le	Not present

**Table 22: VERIFY Command Message** 

Table 23 defines the qualifier of the reference data (P2):

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	As defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 <sup>3</sup>
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Plaintext PIN, format as defined below
1	0	0	0	0	Х	Х	Х	RFU for this specification
1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Enciphered PIN, format as defined in Book 2
1	0	0	0	1	0	Х	Х	RFU for this specification
1	0	0	0	1	1	х	х	RFU for the individual payment systems
1	0	0	1	Х	Х	Х	Х	RFU for the issuer

Table 23: VERIFY Command qualifier of reference data (P2)

The processing of the VERIFY command in the ICC will be defined in combination with the CVM rules as specified in section 10.5.

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 $<sup>^3</sup>$  The value of P2 = '00' is not used by this specification.

The plaintext offline PIN block shall be formatted as follows:

С	N	P	Ρ	Р	Ρ	P/F	F	F								
---	---	---	---	---	---	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	---	---	--

#### where:

	Name	Value
C	Control field	4 bit binary number with value of 0010 (Hex '2')
N	PIN length	4 bit binary number with permissible values of 0100 to 1100 (Hex '4' to 'C')
Р	PIN digit	4 bit binary number with permissible values of 0000 to 1001 (Hex '0' to '9')
P/F	PIN/filler	Determined by PIN length
F	Filler	4 bit binary number with a value of 1111 (Hex 'F')

Table 24: Plaintext Offline PIN Block Format

P2 = '00' indicates that no particular qualifier is used. The processing of the VERIFY command in the ICC should know how to find the PIN data unambiguously.

#### 6.5.12.3 Data Field Sent in the Command Message

The data field of the command message contains the value field of tag '99'.

#### 6.5.12.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message

No data field is returned in the response message.

#### 6.5.12.5 Processing State Returned in the Response Message

'9000' indicates a successful execution of the command.

When for the currently selected application the comparison between the Transaction PIN Data and the reference PIN data performed by the VERIFY command fails, the ICC shall return SW2 = 'Cx', where 'x' represents the number of retries still possible. When the card returns 'C0', no more retries are left, and the CVM shall be blocked. Any subsequent VERIFY command applied in the context of that application shall then fail with SW1 SW2 = '6983'.

# **Part III**

# Debit and Credit Application Specification

# 7 Files for Financial Transaction Interchange

The description of the file structure and commands for accessing the files is found in Part III of Book 1 (for application selection) and Part II of this book (for the application elementary files). The definition of each of the data objects is defined in Annex A.

# 7.1 Mapping Data Objects

The payment system or issuer will map the appropriate data objects to files according to their needs, subject to the following restrictions:

- All files accessible using the READ RECORD command as defined in this specification containing data objects defined in this specification shall use SFIs in the range 1 to 10. These files:
  - Shall be linear files readable using the READ RECORD command as described in this specification.
  - May contain multiple records. Each record is limited to 254 bytes, including tag and length.
  - Each record shall be coded as a constructed data object. The tag of the constructed data object shall be '70' indicating a template proprietary to this specification, and the length field shall contain the total length of the encapsulated data objects.
  - Shall contain only data objects defined in this specification and coded in accordance with the BER-TLV described in Annex B.
  - May have access conditions to be satisfied for updates, but must be readable unconditionally.
- Files with SFIs in the range 11 to 20 are reserved for proprietary data to be specified by the individual payment systems.
- Files with SFIs in the range 21 to 30 are reserved for proprietary data to be specified by the issuer.

• The AFL determines the files and records to be used for processing a transaction. The use of the AFL is described in section 10.2. The data objects listed in Table 25 are used by the offline data authentication algorithm and, when present, should be located in the first record referenced by the AFL.<sup>4</sup>

Tag	Value
'8F'	Certification Authority Public Key Index
'90'	Issuer Public Key Certificate

Table 25: Data Objects Used by the Offline Data Authentication Algorithm

Additional information may be found in complementary payment system documentation.

# 7.2 Mandatory Data Objects

Table 26 lists the data objects that must be present in the ICC in files read using the READ RECORD command. All other data objects defined in this specification to be resident in such files in the card are optional.

Tag	Value	Presence
'5F24'	Application Expiration Date	M
'5A'	Application Primary Account Number (PAN)	M
'8C'	Card Risk Management Data Object List 1	M
'8D'	Card Risk Management Data Object List 2	M

**Table 26: Mandatory Data Objects** 

Table 27 lists the data objects that must be present if the ICC supports offline static data authentication (SDA). Table 28 lists the data objects that must be present if the ICC supports offline dynamic data authentication (DDA and/or CDA).<sup>5</sup> Offline data authentication is required to support offline transactions but is optional in cards that support only online transactions.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This allows the terminal to optionally perform the hashing necessary for data authentication in parallel with reading and parsing of data for other purposes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The exception may be that the Issuer Public Key Remainder or the ICC Public Key Remainder could be absent. This is because if the public key modulus can be recovered in its entirety from the public key certificate there is no need for a remainder.

Tag	Value
'8F'	Certification Authority Public Key Index
'90'	Issuer Public Key Certificate
'93'	Signed Static Application Data
'92'	Issuer Public Key Remainder
'9F32'	Issuer Public Key Exponent

Table 27: Data Required for SDA

Tag	Value
'8F'	Certification Authority Public Key Index
'90'	Issuer Public Key Certificate
'92'	Issuer Public Key Remainder
'9F32'	Issuer Public Key Exponent
'9F46'	ICC Public Key Certificate
'9F47'	ICC Public Key Exponent
'9F48'	ICC Public Key Remainder
'9F49'	Dynamic Data Authentication Data Object List (DDOL) <sup>6</sup>

Table 28: Data Required for DDA and/or CDA

 $<sup>^{6}</sup>$  In case the DDOL is not present in the card, the Default DDOL shall be used instead.

## 7.3 Data Retrievable by GET DATA Command

Data objects listed in Table 29 are not retrievable by the READ RECORD command but are retrieved by the terminal using the GET DATA command as described in this specification.

Of the objects listed here, only the Application Transaction Counter (ATC) is a mandatory data object, and it can be retrieved by either the GET DATA command or in the response to a GENERATE AC command. The terminal retrieves the ATC via the GET DATA command only if the ICC contains the Lower Consecutive Offline Limit (LCOL) and Upper Consecutive Offline Limit (UCOL) data objects. If the issuer does not wish terminal velocity checking to be performed and omits these data objects, the ICC does not need to support the GET DATA command, unless the card supports retrieval of the PIN Try Counter or the Log Format using GET DATA.

Tag	Value	Presence
'9F36'	Application Transaction Counter (ATC)	M
'9F17'	PIN Try Counter	0
'9F13'	Last Online ATC Register	0
'9F4F'	Log Format	0

Table 29: Data Objects Retrievable by GET DATA Command

# 7.4 Data Retrievable by GET PROCESSING OPTIONS

Data objects listed in Table 30 are not retrievable by the READ RECORD command but are retrieved by the terminal using the GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command as described in section 6.5.8. Table 30 defines the data returned, not the format of the response; section 6.5.8.4 describes the format of the data when returned by the GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command.

Tag	Value	Presence
'82'	Application Interchange Profile	M
'94'	Application File Locator	M

Table 30: Data Retrievable by GET PROCESSING OPTIONS

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## 7.5 Erroneous or Missing Data in the ICC

Data objects in the card are classified in section 7.2 as either mandatory or optional. However, some optional data objects must be present to support optional functions selected by the issuer or must be present to avoid inconsistencies if other related data objects are present.

When any mandatory data object is missing, the terminal terminates the transaction unless otherwise specified in these specifications. When an optional data object that is required because of the existence of other data objects or that is required to support functions that must be performed due to the setting of bits in the Application Interchange Profile is missing, the terminal shall set the 'ICC data missing' indicator in the Terminal Verification Results (TVR) to 1.

Table 31 summarises the conditions under which this bit should be set to 1. If none of the conditions in Table 31 applies, the terminal shall set the bit to 0. The setting of this bit is in addition to any other actions specified in other sections of this Book.

During a transaction the terminal shall ignore any data object coming from the ICC which is designated in the EMV data elements dictionary (Table 33 in Annex A) as terminal-sourced or issuer-sourced. The data elements dictionary defines data as being sourced from any of three places: the ICC, the terminal or the issuer.

The correct formatting of certain card-sourced data objects is not critical for completion of a transaction. If during normal processing the terminal recognises that any of the following data objects are incorrectly formatted, it may optionally ignore the formatting error and continue processing.

- Cardholder Name ('5F20')
- Cardholder Name Extended ('9F0B')
- Issuer URL ('5F50')
- Log Entry ('9F4D')
- Log Format ('9F4F')

It is up to the issuer to ensure that data in the card is of the correct format, and no format checking other than that specifically defined is mandated on the part of the terminal. However, if in the course of normal processing the terminal recognises that data is incorrectly formatted, the terminal shall terminate the transaction unless otherwise specified in these specifications. This rule includes (but is not limited to):

- Constructed data objects that do not parse correctly.
- Dates that are out of range (for example, months that are not in the range 1 to 12).
- Other data that must be in a specific range of values but are not.
- Multiple occurrences of a data object that should only appear once.
- An AFL with no entries.
- An AFL entry with invalid syntax, that is, any one or more of the following:
  - An SFI of 0 or 31.
  - A starting record number of 0.
  - An ending record number less than the starting record number (byte 3 < byte 2).</li>
  - Number of records participating in offline data authentication greater than the number of records (byte 4 > byte 3 byte 2 + 1).

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Name	Tag	'ICC Data Missing' Shall Be Set If
Application Transaction Counter (ATC)	'9F36'	ATC is not returned by GET DATA command and both Lower and Upper Consecutive Offline Limit data objects are present
Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) List	'8E'	Not present and AIP indicates that cardholder verification is supported
Certification Authority Public Key Index	'8F'	Not present and AIP indicates any form of offline data authentication is supported (SDA, DDA or CDA)
Issuer Public Key Certificate	'90'	Not present and AIP indicates any form of offline data authentication is supported (SDA, DDA or CDA)
Issuer Public Key Exponent	'9F32'	Not present and AIP indicates any form of offline data authentication is supported (SDA, DDA or CDA)
Issuer Public Key Remainder	'92'	Not present and AIP indicates any form of offline data authentication is supported (SDA, DDA or CDA) and the 'length of the Issuer Public Key', as recovered from the Issuer Public Key Certificate, indicates that there was insufficient space for the entire Issuer's Public Key in the certificate
Last Online Application Transaction Counter (ATC) Register	'9F13'	Last Online ATC Register is not returned by GET DATA command and both Lower and Upper Consecutive Offline Limits are present
Signed Static Application Data	'93'	Not present and AIP indicates SDA supported
ICC Public Key Certificate	'9F46'	Not present and AIP indicates DDA or CDA supported
ICC Public Key Exponent	'9F47'	Not present and AIP indicates DDA or CDA is supported
ICC Public Key Remainder	'9F48'	Not present and AIP indicates DDA or CDA is supported and the 'length of the ICC Public Key', as recovered from the ICC Public Key Certificate, indicates that there was insufficient space for the entire ICC's Public Key in the certificate

**Table 31: ICC Data Missing Indicator Setting** 

#### 8 Transaction Flow

The Application Interchange Profile specifies the application functions that are supported by the card. The terminal shall attempt to execute only those functions that the ICC supports. The functions shall be performed according to the Conditions of Execution as specified in section 10.

Book 1 describes all functionality outside the application layer, including the selection of the application. The functions described here begin after application selection has taken place.

The remainder of this book deals with the terminal-to-ICC dialogue on the level of the application logical functions. Section 8.2 describes a possible transaction flow.

## 8.1 Exception Handling

Exceptions to normal processing are described in this Book for specific status codes returned in the status bytes (SW1, SW2) or for missing data. Unless otherwise specified in these specifications, any SW1 SW2 returned by the transport layer to the application layer other than '9000', '63Cx', or '6283' shall cause termination of the transaction.<sup>7</sup> This requirement applies throughout these specifications except for the Application Selection process described in Book 1.

# 8.2 Example Flowchart

The flowchart in Figure 6 gives an example of a transaction flow that may be used by a terminal for a normal purchase transaction. This flowchart is only an example, and the order of processing may differ from that given here. All restrictions on the order of processing are provided in section 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Other actions may be taken by prior agreement but are outside the scope of this specification.




Figure 6: Transaction Flow Example

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#### 8.3 Additional Functions

Provision has been made in this specification for additional functions beyond those described here. Such additional functions may be:

- future additions to this specification
- proprietary functions implemented by local or national agreement or by the individual payment systems

The Application Interchange Profile indicates the functions supported in the ICC according to this specification. Most of the bits in this data object are reserved for future use (RFU). When a new function is added, a bit in the Application Interchange Profile will be allocated to indicate support for the new function, and this specification will be updated to specify the new function and where it fits into the transaction flow.

Proprietary functions may be added to the terminal and the ICC application as long as they do not interfere with processing of terminals and ICCs not implementing the function. For example, offline dynamic data authentication based on symmetric keys may be added at local option. Such proprietary functions, while not described in this specification, are not precluded, as long as the functions specified herein continue to be supported for all ICCs, including those not implementing the proprietary functions.

# 9 GENERATE AC Command Coding

The GENERATE AC command format and response codes are described fully in section 6.5.5. This section describes how the various options and data elements are used in transaction processing. Figure 7 depicts the interaction between the terminal decisions, ICC decisions, issuer approval, the GENERATE AC command, and the possible ICC responses.

The complete transaction flow is not shown in this chart, only the GENERATE AC commands, responses, and associated decisions.




Figure 7: Use of GENERATE AC Options

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#### 9.1 Command Parameters

The GENERATE AC command parameters provide three different options to the terminal:

- Request for the generation of a TC
- Request for the generation of an ARQC
- Request for the generation of an AAC

#### 9.2 Command Data

The data field of the GENERATE AC command is not TLV encoded, so it is imperative that the ICC knows the format of this data when the command is received. This is achieved by allowing the ICC to specify the format of the data to be included in the GENERATE AC command using a Card Risk Management Data Object List (CDOL).

#### 9.2.1 Card Risk Management Data

The CDOL is a data object in the ICC that provides to the terminal a list of data objects that must be passed from the terminal to the ICC in the GENERATE AC command. There shall be two CDOLs in the ICC, referred to as CDOL1 (tag '8C') and CDOL2 (tag '8D'). CDOL1 is used with the first GENERATE AC command, and CDOL2 is used with the second GENERATE AC command (if used). The terminal uses the appropriate CDOL and the rules specified in section 5.4 to build the appropriate data field for the command. It is the responsibility of the terminal to ensure that current data is used in building the GENERATE AC command. To this end, the command data should be built immediately prior to issuing the GENERATE AC command.

#### 9.2.2 Transaction Certificate Data

A CDOL may request a TC Hash Value to be included in the command data of a GENERATE AC command. The TDOL is a data object that provides to the terminal a list of data objects to be used in generating the TC Hash Value. The ICC may contain the TDOL, but there may be a default TDOL in the terminal, specified by the payment system, for use in case the TDOL is not present in the ICC. To create the hash value, the terminal shall use the TDOL (if present) or the default TDOL to create the appropriate value for input to the hash algorithm, applying the rules specified in section 5.4. If the default TDOL is used, the terminal shall set the 'Default TDOL used' bit in the TVR to 1. If a default TDOL is required but is not present in the terminal, a default TDOL with no data objects in the list shall be assumed. If this event occurs, since the default TDOL was not used, the terminal shall not set the 'Default TDOL Used' bit in the TVR to 1.

If the terminal issues a second GENERATE AC command during the processing of a transaction, the terminal shall ensure that the data provided in the TC Hash Value is current at the time the command is issued.

#### 9.3 Command Use

Either one or two GENERATE AC commands are issued during the processing of a transaction according to this specification.

The ICC shall respond to the first GENERATE AC command with any of the following:

- TC
- ARQC
- AAC

The ICC shall respond to a second GENERATE AC command with either a TC or an AAC.

The possible responses listed above are in hierarchical order, with a TC being the highest and an AAC being the lowest. The terminal may request a TC, an ARQC, or an AAC. If the ICC responds with a cryptogram at a higher level or with a cryptogram of an undefined type, this indicates a logic error in the ICC. If this occurs after the first GENERATE AC command in a transaction, the transaction shall be terminated. If it occurs after the second GENERATE AC command, all processing for the transaction has been completed, and the cryptogram returned shall be treated as an AAC.

If the ICC response is an approval (TC) or online authorisation request (ARQC) and the 'CDA signature requested' bit in the GENERATE AC command is 1, the ICC shall return the GENERATE AC response in a public key signature as specified in Book 2 section 6.6.

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#### 9.3.1 GENERATE AC (First Issuance)

The terminal completes its online/offline decision process with a GENERATE AC command (see section 6.5.5). The form of the command depends upon the decision made by the terminal:

- If the terminal decides the transaction might be completed offline, it requests a TC from the ICC. The ICC shall reply with a TC, an ARQC, or an AAC, depending upon its own analysis of the transaction.
- If the terminal decides the transaction should go online, it requests an ARQC from the ICC. The ICC shall reply with an ARQC, or an AAC.
- If the terminal decides to reject the transaction, it requests an AAC from the ICC. The ICC shall reply with an AAC.

If the ICC responds with a TC or an AAC, the terminal completes the transaction offline.

If the ICC responds with an ARQC, the terminal attempts to go online, sending an authorisation request message to the issuer. Included in the authorisation request message is the ARQC for online card authentication.

#### 9.3.2 GENERATE AC (Second Issuance)

Whether the terminal receives an authorisation response message as a result of online processing or an approval or rejection by using the Issuer Action Code - Default, it completes the transaction by requesting either a TC (in the case an approval was obtained) or an AAC (in case the issuer's instruction is to reject the transaction) from the ICC. If a TC was requested, the ICC shall reply with either a TC or an AAC. If an AAC was requested, the card shall reply with an AAC.

The ICC shall permit at most two GENERATE AC commands in a transaction. If the terminal issues more than two, the third and all succeeding GENERATE AC commands shall end with SW1 SW2 = '6985', and no cryptogram shall be returned.

# 10 Functions Used in Transaction Processing

The following sections shall be read in conjunction with Book 4, Part II, which may contain additional terminal-specific requirements.

# 10.1 Initiate Application Processing

#### Purpose:

The Initiate Application Processing function:

- informs the ICC that the processing of a new transaction is beginning
- provides to the ICC the terminal-related information about the transaction
- obtains from the ICC the Application Interchange Profile and a list of files that contain the ICC data to be used in processing the transaction
- determines whether the transaction is allowed

#### **Conditions of Execution:**

The terminal shall always execute this function.

#### Sequence of Execution:

This is the first function performed after Application Selection.

#### **Description:**

The terminal shall set all bits in the Transaction Status Information (TSI) and the Terminal Verification Results (TVR) to 0.8

The PDOL is a list of tags and lengths of terminal-resident data elements needed by the ICC in processing the GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command. Only data elements having the terminal as the source of the data may be referenced in the PDOL.

If the PDOL does not exist, the GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command uses a command data field of '8300', indicating that the length of the value field in the command data is zero.

If the PDOL exists, the terminal extracts the PDOL from the FCI of the ADF and uses it to create a concatenated list of data elements without tags or lengths. The rules specified in section 5.4 apply to processing of the PDOL.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> There may be some exceptions in the timing for this. For example, these bits could be set to 0 at the completion of the previous transaction or prior to application selection of this transaction. The intent here is that the processing steps as described in the Application Specification presume the bits have been initialised to 0.

The terminal issues the GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command using either the command data field of '8300' (if there was no PDOL in the ICC) or a data object constructed with a tag of '83' and the appropriate length according to BER-TLV encoding rules and a value field that is the concatenated list of data elements resulting from processing the PDOL. The card returns either:

- The Application Interchange Profile, the Application File Locator (identifying the files and records containing the data to be used for the transaction), and status SW1 SW2 = '9000', or
- Status SW1 SW2 = '6985' ('Conditions of use not satisfied'), indicating that the transaction cannot be performed with this application.

The format of the response message is given in section 6.5.8.

If the status words '6985' are returned, the terminal shall eliminate the current application from consideration and return to the Application Selection function to select another application.

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# 10.2 Read Application Data

## **Purpose:**

Data contained in files in the ICC are required by the terminal to perform the various functions used in transaction processing as described in this section. The terminal must read this data from the ICC.

#### Conditions of Execution:

The terminal shall always execute this function.

## Sequence of Execution:

The Read Application Data function is performed immediately following the Initiate Application Processing function.

## **Description:**

The terminal shall read the files and records indicated in the AFL using the READ RECORD command identifying the file by its SFI. If an error prevents the terminal from reading data from the ICC, the transaction shall be terminated (see section 8.1).

The AFL is a list identifying the files and records to be used in the processing of a transaction. The terminal is to read only the records named in the AFL. Each element of the list corresponds to a file to be read and is structured as follows:

- The five most significant bits of the first byte indicate the SFI. The three least significant bits of the first byte shall be set to zero.
- The second byte indicates the first (or only) record number to be read for that SFI. The second byte shall never be set to zero.
- The third byte indicates the last record number to be read for that SFI. Its value is either greater than or equal to the second byte. When the third byte is greater than the second byte, all the records ranging from the record number in the second byte to and including the record number in the third byte shall be read for that SFI. When the third byte is equal to the second byte, only the record number coded in the second byte shall be read for that SFI.
- The fourth byte indicates the number of records involved in offline data authentication starting with the record number coded in the second byte. The fourth byte may range from zero to the value of the third byte less the value of the second byte plus 1.

The terminal shall process each entry in the AFL from left to right. A READ RECORD command as described in section 6.5.11 shall be issued for each record between the starting record number and the ending record number, inclusively. Any SW1 SW2 other than '9000' passed to the application layer as a result of reading any record shall cause the transaction to be terminated. Records specified in the AFL to be included in offline data authentication shall be processed as described in section 10.3.

The terminal shall store all recognised data objects read, whether mandatory or optional, for later use in the transaction processing. Data objects that are not recognised by the terminal (that is, their tags are unknown by the terminal) shall not be stored, but records containing such data objects may still participate in their entirety in offline data authentication, depending upon the coding of the AFL.<sup>9</sup>

All mandatory data objects shall be present in the card. If any mandatory data objects are not present, the terminal shall terminate the transaction.

Redundant primitive data objects are not permitted. If the terminal encounters more than one occurrence of a single primitive data object while reading data from the ICC, the transaction shall be terminated.

Proprietary data files may or may not conform to this specification. Records in proprietary files may be represented in the AFL and may participate in offline data authentication if they are readable without conditions by the READ RECORD command coded according to this specification. Otherwise, the reading and processing of proprietary files is beyond the scope of this specification.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Payment system-specific tags are interpreted within the context of the application RID. Issuer-specific tags are interpreted within the context of the Issuer Identification Number (as defined in ISO/IEC 7812-1). Additionally, to satisfy business requirements such as proprietary domestic processing, multiple issuers may agree on the definition of a private class tag. Such tags may be interpreted in the context of other data such as Issuer Country Code.

## 10.3 Offline Data Authentication

## **Purpose:**

Offline data authentication is performed as specified in Book 2. This specification describes how it is determined whether offline data authentication will be performed, what kind of authentication will be performed, and how the success or failure of authentication affects the transaction flow and data recorded in the TVR and TSI.

## **Conditions of Execution:**

Availability of data in the ICC to support offline data authentication is optional; its presence is indicated in the Application Interchange Profile. If the terminal and the ICC support a common method of offline data authentication, the terminal shall perform offline data authentication. Depending on the capabilities of the card and the terminal, SDA or DDA or CDA is performed.

If both of the following are true, the terminal shall perform CDA as specified in Book 2:

- The Application Interchange Profile indicates that the card supports CDA.
- The terminal supports CDA.

If all of the following are true, the terminal shall perform DDA as specified in Book 2:

- The Application Interchange Profile indicates that the card supports DDA.
- The terminal supports DDA.
- Either the card or terminal (or both) does not support CDA.

If all of the following are true, the terminal shall perform SDA as specified in this specification:

- The Application Interchange Profile indicates that the card supports SDA.
- The terminal supports SDA.
- Either the card or the terminal (or both) does not support DDA.
- Either the card or terminal (or both) does not support CDA.

If neither SDA nor DDA nor CDA is performed, the terminal shall set the 'Offline data authentication was not performed' bit in the TVR to 1.

## Sequence of Execution:

The terminal shall perform offline data authentication in any order after Read Application Data but before completion of the terminal action analysis.

**Note:** Although the terminal shall commence performing CDA before completion of Terminal Action Analysis, the terminal will not normally finish performing CDA until after it has received the response to the GENERATE AC command. (This is a necessary consequence of the design of CDA.)

## **Description:**

SDA authenticates static data put into the card by the issuer. DDA and CDA authenticate ICC-resident data, data from the terminal, and the card itself.

Input to the authentication process is formed from the records identified by the AFL, followed by the data elements identified by the optional Static Data Authentication Tag List (tag '9F4A').

Only those records identified in the AFL as participating in offline data authentication are to be processed. Records are processed in the same sequence in which they appear within AFL entries. The records identified by a single AFL entry are to be processed in record number sequence. The first record begins the input for the authentication process, and each succeeding record is concatenated at the end of the previous record.

The records read for offline data authentication shall be TLV-coded with tag equal to '70'.

The data from each record to be included in the offline data authentication input depends upon the SFI of the file from which the record was read.

- For files with SFI in the range 1 to 10, the record tag ('70') and the record length are excluded from the offline data authentication process. All other data in the data field of the response to the READ RECORD command (excluding SW1 SW2) is included.
- For files with SFI in the range 11 to 30, the record tag ('70') and the record length are not excluded from the offline data authentication process. Thus all data in the data field of the response to the READ RECORD command (excluding SW1 SW2) is included.

If the records read for offline data authentication are not TLV-coded with tag equal to '70' then offline data authentication shall be considered to have been performed and to have failed; that is, the terminal shall set the 'Offline data authentication was performed' bit in the TSI to 1, and shall set the appropriate 'SDA failed' or 'DDA failed' or 'CDA failed' bit in the TVR.

The bytes of the record are included in the concatenation in the order in which they appear in the command response.

After all records identified by the AFL have been processed, the Static Data Authentication Tag List is processed, if it exists. If the Static Data Authentication Tag List exists, it shall contain only the tag for the Application Interchange Profile. The tag must represent the AIP available in the current application. The value field of the AIP is to be concatenated to the current end of the input string. The tag and length of the AIP are not included in the concatenation.

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Building of the input list for offline data authentication is considered the first step in the offline data authentication process. If the input cannot be built because of a violation of one of the above rules but offline data authentication should be performed according to the 'Conditions of Execution' above, offline data authentication shall be considered to have been performed and to have failed; that is, the terminal shall set the 'Offline data authentication was performed' bit in the TSI to 1 and shall set the appropriate 'SDA failed' or 'DDA failed' or 'CDA failed' bit in the TVR.

See Book 2 for additional steps to be performed for offline data authentication.

If SDA is performed but is unsuccessful, the 'SDA failed' bit in the TVR shall be set to 1; otherwise it shall be set to 0.

If DDA is performed but is unsuccessful, the 'DDA failed' bit in the TVR shall be set to 1; otherwise it shall be set to 0.

If CDA is performed but is unsuccessful, the 'CDA failed' bit in the TVR shall be set to 1; otherwise it shall be set to 0.

Upon completion of the offline data authentication function, the terminal shall set the 'Offline data authentication was performed' bit in the TSI to 1.

# 10.4 Processing Restrictions

## **Purpose:**

The purpose of the Processing Restrictions function is to determine the degree of compatibility of the application in the terminal with the application in the ICC and to make any necessary adjustments, including possible rejection of the transaction.

#### **Conditions of Execution:**

The terminal shall always execute this function.

## Sequence of Execution:

Functions described here may be performed at any time after Read Application Data and prior to completion of the terminal action analysis.

## **Description:**

The Processing Restrictions function comprises the following compatibility checks:

- Application Version Number
- Application Usage Control
- Application Effective/Expiration Dates Checking

## 10.4.1 Application Version Number

The application within both the terminal and the ICC shall maintain an Application Version Number assigned by the payment system. The terminal shall use the version number in the ICC to ensure compatibility. If the Application Version Number is not present in the ICC, the terminal shall presume the terminal and ICC application versions are compatible, and transaction processing shall continue. If the Application Version Number is present in the ICC, it shall be compared to the Application Version Number maintained in the terminal. If they are different, the terminal shall set the 'ICC and terminal have different application versions' bit in the TVR to 1.

## 10.4.2 Application Usage Control

The Application Usage Control indicates restrictions limiting the application geographically or to certain types of transactions. If this data object is present, the terminal shall make the following checks:

- If the transaction is being conducted at an ATM, the 'Valid at ATMs' bit must be on in Application Usage Control.
- If the transaction is not being conducted at an ATM, the 'Valid at terminals other than ATMs' bit must be on in Application Usage Control.

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If the Application Usage Control and Issuer Country Code are both present in the ICC, the terminal shall make the checks described in Table 32.

If:	and if Issuer Country Code:	then the following bit must be set to 1 in Application Usage Control:
Transaction Type indicates cash	matches Terminal Country Code	'Valid for domestic cash transactions'
transaction	does not match Terminal Country Code	'Valid for international cash transactions'
Transaction Type indicates	matches Terminal Country Code	'Valid for domestic goods' and/or 'Valid for domestic services'
purchase (of goods/services)	does not match Terminal Country Code	'Valid for international goods' and/or 'Valid for international services'
transaction has a cashback amount	matches Terminal Country Code	'Domestic cashback allowed'
	does not match Terminal Country Code	'International cashback allowed'

**Table 32: Terminal Action Regarding Application Usage Control** 

If any of the above tests fail, the terminal shall set the 'Requested service not allowed for card product' bit in the TVR to 1.

# 10.4.3 Application Effective/Expiration Dates Checking

If the Application Effective Date is present in the ICC, the terminal shall check that the current date is greater than or equal to the Application Effective Date. If it is not, the terminal shall set the 'Application not yet effective' bit in the TVR to 1.

The terminal shall check that the current date is less than or equal to the Application Expiration Date. If it is not, the terminal shall set the 'Expired application' bit in the TVR to 1.

## 10.5 Cardholder Verification

## **Purpose:**

Cardholder verification is performed to ensure that the person presenting the ICC is the person to whom the application in the card was issued.

#### **Conditions of Execution:**

Ability of the ICC to support at least one cardholder verification method is indicated in the Application Interchange Profile, as shown in Annex C1. If this bit is set to 1, the terminal shall use the cardholder verification related data in the ICC to determine whether one of the issuer-specified cardholder verification methods (CVMs) shall be executed. This process is described below.

## Sequence of Execution:

This function may be performed any time after Read Application Data and before completion of the terminal action analysis.

## **Description:**

The CVM List (tag '8E') is a composite data object consisting of the following:

- 1. An amount field (4 bytes, binary format), referred to as 'X' in Table 40: CVM Condition Codes. 'X' is expressed in the Application Currency Code with implicit decimal point. For example, 123 (hexadecimal '7B') represents £1.23 when the currency code is '826'.
- 2. A second amount field (4 bytes, binary format), referred to as 'Y' in Table 40. 'Y' is expressed in Application Currency Code with implicit decimal point. For example, 123 (hexadecimal '7B') represents £1.23 when the currency code is '826'.
- 3. A variable-length list of two-byte data elements called Cardholder Verification Rules (CV Rules). Each CV Rule describes a CVM and the conditions under which that CVM should be applied (see Annex C3).

If the CVM List is not present in the ICC, the terminal shall terminate cardholder verification without setting the 'Cardholder verification was performed' bit in the TSI.

**Note:** A CVM List with no Cardholder Verification Rules is considered to be the same as a CVM List not being present.

If the CVM List is present in the ICC, the terminal shall process each rule in the order in which it appears in the list according to the following specifications. Cardholder verification is completed when any one CVM is successfully performed or when the list is exhausted.

If the terminal encounters formatting errors in the CVM List such as a list with an odd number of bytes (that is, with an incomplete CVM Rule), the terminal shall terminate the transaction as specified in Book 3 section 7.5.

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If any of the following is true:

- the conditions expressed in the second byte of a CV Rule are not satisfied, or
- data required by the condition (for example, the Application Currency Code or Amount, Authorised) is not present, or
- the CVM Condition Code is outside the range of codes understood by the terminal (which might occur if the terminal application program is at a different version level than the ICC application),

then the terminal shall bypass the rule and proceed to the next. If there are no more CV Rules in the list, cardholder verification has not been successful, and the terminal shall set the 'Cardholder verification was not successful' bit in the TVR to 1.

If the conditions expressed in the second byte of the CV Rule are satisfied, the terminal next checks whether it recognises the CVM coded in the first byte of the CV Rule and proceeds according to the following steps:

- 1. If the CVM is recognised, the terminal next checks to determine whether it supports the CVM.
  - If the CVM is supported, the terminal shall attempt to perform it.
    - o If the CVM is performed successfully, cardholder verification is complete and successful. If the CVM just processed was 'Fail CVM Processing', the terminal shall set the 'Cardholder verification was not successful' bit in the TVR (b8 of byte 3) to 1 and no further CVMs shall be processed regardless of the setting of b7 of byte 1 in the first byte of the CV Rule. 10
    - o If the CVM is not performed successfully, processing continues at step 2.
  - If the CVM is not supported, processing continues at step 2. In addition, the terminal shall set the 'PIN entry required and PIN pad not present or not working' bit (b5 of byte 3) of the TVR to 1 for the following cases:
    - o The CVM was online PIN and online PIN was not supported
    - o The CVM included any form of offline PIN, and neither form of offline PIN was supported.

If the CVM is not recognised, the terminal shall set the 'Unrecognised CVM' bit in the TVR (b7 of byte 3) to 1 and processing continues at step 2.

2. If cardholder verification was not completed in step 1 (that is, the CVM was not recognised, was not supported, or failed), the terminal examines b7 of byte 1 of the CV Rule.

 $<sup>^{10}</sup>$  If a card CVM List contains an entry for 'Fail CVM Processing,' it is strongly recommended that byte 1 bit 7 be set to 0 for this entry.

- If b7 is set to 1, processing continues with the next CV Rule, if one is present.
- If b7 is set to 0, or there are no more CV Rules in the list, cardholder verification is complete and unsuccessful. The terminal shall set the 'Cardholder verification was not successful' bit in the TVR (b8 of byte 3) to 1.

When cardholder verification is completed, the terminal shall:

- set the CVM Results according to Book 4 section 6.3.4.5
- set the 'Cardholder verification was performed' bit in the TSI to 1.

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## 10.5.1 Offline PIN Processing

This section applies to the verification by the ICC of a plaintext or enciphered PIN presented by the terminal.

If an offline PIN is the selected CVM as determined by the above process, offline PIN processing may not be successfully performed for any one of the following reasons:

- The terminal does not support offline PIN.<sup>11</sup> In this case, the terminal shall set the 'PIN entry required and PIN pad not present or not working' bit in the TVR to 1.
- The terminal supports offline PIN, but the PIN pad is malfunctioning. In this case, the terminal shall set the 'PIN entry required and PIN pad not present or not working' bit in the TVR to 1.
- The terminal bypassed PIN entry at the direction of either the merchant or the cardholder. <sup>12</sup> In this case, the terminal shall set the 'PIN entry required, PIN pad present, but PIN was not entered' bit in the TVR to 1. The terminal shall consider this CVM unsuccessful and shall continue cardholder verification processing in accordance with the card's CVM List.
- The PIN is blocked upon initial use of the VERIFY command or if recovery of the enciphered PIN Block has failed (the ICC returns SW1 SW2 = '6983' or '6984' in response to the VERIFY command). In this case, the terminal shall set the 'PIN Try Limit exceeded' bit in the TVR to 1.
- The number of remaining PIN tries is reduced to zero (indicated by an SW1 SW2 of '63C0' in the response to the VERIFY command). In this case, the terminal shall set the 'PIN Try Limit exceeded' bit in the TVR to 1.

The only case in which offline PIN processing is considered successful is when the ICC returns an SW1 SW2 of '9000' in response to the VERIFY command.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> This means that the terminal does not support either offline plaintext PIN verification or offline enciphered PIN verification. If the terminal supports at least one of these functions, it is considered to support offline PIN for the purposes of setting the TVR bits.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Especially for a new cardholder or during conversion to PINs, it is likely that a cardholder will realize that he or she does not know the PIN. In this case, it is better to bypass PIN processing with an indication to the issuer of the circumstances than it is to either terminate the transaction or try numbers until the PIN try count is exhausted. If the transaction goes online, the issuer can decide whether to accept the transaction without the PIN.

## 10.5.2 Online PIN Processing

If online PIN processing is a required CVM as determined by the above process, the processing may not be successfully performed for any one of the following reasons:

- The terminal does not support online PIN. In this case, the terminal shall set the 'PIN entry required and PIN pad not present or not working' bit in the TVR to 1.
- The terminal supports online PIN, but the PIN pad is malfunctioning. In this case, the terminal shall set the 'PIN entry required and PIN pad not present or not working' bit in the TVR to 1.
- The terminal bypassed PIN entry at the direction of either the merchant or the cardholder. In this case, the terminal shall set the 'PIN entry required, PIN pad present, but PIN was not entered' bit in the TVR to 1.

If the online PIN is successfully entered, the terminal shall set the 'Online PIN entered' bit in the TVR to 1. In this case, cardholder verification is considered successful and complete.

## 10.5.3 Signature Processing

If a (paper) signature is a required CVM as determined by the above process, the terminal shall determine success based upon the terminal's capability to support the signature process (see complementary payment systems documentation for additional information). If the terminal is able to support signature, the process is considered successful, and cardholder verification is complete.

## 10.5.4 Combination CVMs

Some CVMs require multiple verification methods (for example, offline PIN plus signature). For these CVMs, all methods in the CVM must be successful for cardholder verification to be considered successful.

## 10.5.5 CVM Processing Logic

The flows on the following pages illustrate the CVM processing logic but do not contain all the details of the execution of the selected CVM.

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


Figure 8: CVM Processing (Part 1 of 5)




Figure 9: CVM Processing (Part 2 of 5)

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


Figure 10: CVM Processing (Part 3 of 5)




Figure 11: CVM Processing (Part 4 of 5)

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


Figure 12: CVM Processing (Part 5 of 5)

# 10.6 Terminal Risk Management

## **Purpose:**

Terminal risk management is that portion of risk management performed by the terminal to protect the acquirer, issuer, and system from fraud. It provides positive issuer authorisation for high-value transactions and ensures that transactions initiated from ICCs go online periodically to protect against threats that might be undetectable in an offline environment. The result of terminal risk management is the setting of appropriate bits in the TVR.

#### **Conditions of Execution:**

Terminal risk management shall always be performed regardless of the setting of the 'Terminal risk management is to be performed' bit in the Application Interchange Profile. Random transaction selection need not be performed by a terminal with no online capability.

## Sequence of Execution:

Terminal risk management may be performed at any time after Read Application Data but before issuing the first GENERATE AC command.

## **Description:**

Terminal risk management consists of:

- Floor limit checking
- Random transaction selection
- Velocity checking

Upon completion of terminal risk management, the terminal shall set the 'Terminal risk management was performed' bit in the TSI to 1.

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## 10.6.1 Floor Limits

To prevent split sales, the terminal may have a transaction log of approved transactions stored in the terminal consisting of at least the Application PAN and transaction amount and possibly the Application PAN Sequence Number and Transaction Date. The number of transactions to be stored and maintenance of the log are outside the scope of this specification, although to prevent split sales the number of transactions stored may be quite small.

During terminal risk management floor limit checking, the terminal checks the transaction log (if available) to determine if there is a log entry with the same Application PAN, and, optionally, the same Application PAN Sequence Number. If there are several log entries with the same PAN, the terminal selects the most recent entry. The terminal adds the Amount, Authorised for the current transaction to the amount stored in the log for that PAN to determine if the sum exceeds the Terminal Floor Limit. If the sum is greater than or equal to the Terminal Floor Limit, the terminal shall set the 'Transaction exceeds floor limit' bit in the TVR to 1.

If the terminal does not have a transaction log available or if there is no log entry with the same PAN, the Amount, Authorised is compared to the appropriate floor limit. If the amount authorised is equal to or greater than the floor limit, the terminal sets the 'Transaction exceeds floor limit' bit to 1 in the TVR.

## 10.6.2 Random Transaction Selection

For each application the relevant payment system specifies, in addition to the floor limit:

- 'Target Percentage to be Used for Random Selection' (in the range of 0 to 99)
- Threshold Value for Biased Random Selection (which must be zero or a positive number less than the floor limit)
- 'Maximum Target Percentage to be Used for Biased Random Selection' (also in the range of 0 to 99 but at least as high as the previous 'Target Percentage to be Used for Random Selection'). This is the desired percentage of transactions 'just below' the floor limit that will be selected by this algorithm.

Any transaction with a transaction amount less than the Threshold Value for Biased Random Selection will be subject to selection at random without further regard for the value of the transaction. The terminal shall generate a random number in the range of 1 to 99. If this random number is less than or equal to the 'Target Percentage to be used for Random Selection', the transaction shall be selected.

Any transaction with a transaction amount equal to or greater than the Threshold Value for Biased Random Selection but less than the floor limit will be subject to selection with bias toward sending higher value transactions online more frequently (biased random selection). For these transactions, the terminal shall compare its generated random number against a Transaction Target Percent, which is a linear interpolation of the target percentages provided by the payment system ('Target Percentage to be used for Random Selection' and 'Maximum Target Percentage to be used for Biased Random Selection'). <sup>13</sup> If the random number is less than or equal to the Transaction Target Percent, the transaction shall be selected.

Figure 13 illustrates the probability of selection as a function of the transaction amount:




Figure 13: Random Transaction Selection Example

If the transaction is selected through the process described in this section, the terminal shall set the 'Transaction selected randomly for online processing' bit in the TVR to 1.

 $Interpolation \ factor = \frac{Amount, \ Authorised - Threshold \ Value}{Floor \ Limit - Threshold \ Value}$   $Transaction \ Target \ Percent \ = \ \left(\left(Maximum \ Target \ Percent \ - \ Target \ Percent\right) \ \times \ Interpolation \ factor\right)$   $+ \ Target \ Percent$ 

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> The Transaction Target Percent is calculated as follows:

## 10.6.3 Velocity Checking

If both the Lower Consecutive Offline Limit (tag '9F14') and Upper Consecutive Offline Limit (tag '9F23') exist, the terminal shall perform velocity checking as described in this section. <sup>14</sup> If either of these data objects is not present in the ICC application, the terminal shall skip this section.

The ATC and Last Online ATC Register shall be read from the ICC using GET DATA commands. If either of the required data objects is not returned by the ICC in response to the GET DATA command, or if the value of the ATC is less than or equal to the value in the Last Online ATC Register, the terminal shall:

- Set both the 'Lower consecutive offline limit exceeded' and the 'Upper consecutive offline limit exceeded' bits in the TVR to 1.
- Not set the 'New card' indicator in the TVR unless the Last Online ATC Register is returned and equals zero.
- End velocity checking for this transaction.

If the required data objects are available, the terminal shall compare the difference between the ATC and the Last Online ATC Register with the Lower Consecutive Offline Limit to see if the limit has been exceeded. If the difference is equal to the Lower Consecutive Offline Limit, this means that the limit has not yet been exceeded. If the limit has been exceeded, the terminal shall set the 'Lower consecutive offline limit exceeded' bit in the TVR to 1 and also compare the difference with the Upper Consecutive Offline Limit to see if the upper limit has been exceeded. If it has, the terminal shall set the 'Upper consecutive offline limit exceeded' bit in the TVR to 1.

The terminal shall also check the Last Online ATC Register for a zero value. If it is zero, the terminal shall set the 'New card' bit in the TVR to 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The purpose of velocity checking is to allow an issuer to request that, after a certain number of consecutive offline transactions (the Lower Consecutive Offline Limit), transactions should be completed online. However, if the terminal is incapable of going online, transactions may still be completed offline until a second (Upper Consecutive Offline Limit) limit is reached. After the upper limit is reached, the recommendation of the issuer might be to reject any transaction that cannot be completed online. Once a transaction has been completed online with successful issuer authentication, the count begins anew, so that transactions may be processed offline until the lower limit is again reached.

# 10.7 Terminal Action Analysis

## **Purpose:**

Once terminal risk management and application functions related to a normal offline transaction have been completed, the terminal makes the first decision as to whether the transaction should be approved offline, declined offline, or transmitted online.

- If the outcome of this decision process is to proceed offline, the terminal issues a GENERATE AC command to ask the ICC to return a TC.
- If the outcome of the decision is to go online, the terminal issues a GENERATE AC command to ask the ICC for an Authorisation Request Cryptogram (ARQC).
- If the decision is to reject the transaction, the terminal issues a GENERATE AC to ask for an Application Authentication Cryptogram (AAC).

An offline decision made here is not final. If the terminal asks for a TC from the ICC, the ICC, as a result of card risk management, may return an ARQC or AAC.

#### **Conditions of Execution:**

The terminal action analysis function is always performed.

## Sequence of Execution:

The terminal action analysis function is performed after terminal risk management and cardholder and/or merchant transaction data entry has been completed. It shall be performed prior to the first use of the GENERATE AC command.

The Issuer Action Code - Default and Terminal Action Code - Default processing described below shall also be performed after online processing is attempted in the case where the terminal was unable to process the transaction online.

The terminal action analysis function may be executed at several places during a transaction to eliminate the need for unnecessary processing. If any processing results in the setting of a bit in the TVR (for example, failure of cardholder verification), it may be desirable to perform this function immediately to determine whether the transaction should be rejected offline based upon the issuer's parameters in the ICC or the acquirer's parameters in the terminal. Recognition of such a decision early in processing may allow the terminal to avoid prolonging a transaction that will ultimately be rejected. Multiple execution of this decision process is optional on the part of the terminal.

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## **Description:**

The terminal shall make a preliminary decision to reject the transaction, complete it online, or complete it offline based upon the TVR, issuer action preferences, and acquirer action preferences according to the method described in this section.

The ICC contains (optionally) three data elements to reflect the issuer's selected action to be taken based upon the content of the TVR. Each of the three data elements has defaults specified here in case any of these data elements are absent from the ICC. The three data elements are:

- Issuer Action Code Denial
- Issuer Action Code Online
- Issuer Action Code Default

Collectively, these three data objects are termed the Issuer Action Codes. The purpose of each is described in this section. The format of each is identical and mirrors the TVR. Each has one bit corresponding to each bit in the TVR, and the Issuer Action Code (IAC) bit specifies an action to be taken if the corresponding bit in the TVR is set to 1. Thus, the size and format of each of the Issuer Action Codes is identical to the TVR.

Similarly, the terminal may contain three data elements to reflect the acquirer's selected action to be taken based upon the content of the TVR. These data elements are:

- Terminal Action Code Denial
- Terminal Action Code Online
- Terminal Action Code Default

Collectively, these three data objects are termed the Terminal Action Codes. The purpose of each is described in this section. The format of each is identical and mirrors the TVR. Each has one bit corresponding to each bit in the TVR, and the Terminal Action Code (TAC) bit specifies an action to be taken if the corresponding bit in the TVR is set to 1. Thus, the size and format of each of the Terminal Action Codes is identical to the TVR and to the Issuer Action Codes.

The existence of each of the Terminal Action Codes is optional. In the absence of any Terminal Action Code, a default value consisting of all bits set to 0 is to be used in its place. However, it is strongly recommended that as a minimum, the Terminal Action Code - Online and Terminal Action Code - Default should be included with the bits corresponding to 'Offline data authentication was not performed', and either 'SDA failed', or 'DDA failed' or 'CDA failed' set to 1.15

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> This protects against a fraudulent card with all the bits in the Issuer Action Code set to 0. Without this protection, such a card could be created with no possibility of going online or declining transactions. All transactions would be approved offline.

Processing of the action codes is done in pairs, that is, the Issuer Action Code - Denial is processed together with the Terminal Action Code - Denial, the Issuer Action Code - Online is processed together with the Terminal Action Code - Online, and the Issuer Action Code - Default is processed together with the Terminal Action Code - Default. Processing of the action codes shall be performed in the order specified here.

If the Issuer Action Code - Denial does not exist, a default value with all bits set to 0 is to be used. Together, the Issuer Action Code - Denial and the Terminal Action Code - Denial specify the conditions that cause denial of a transaction without attempting to go online. If either data object exists, the terminal shall inspect each bit in the TVR. For each bit in the TVR that has a value of 1, the terminal shall check the corresponding bits in the Issuer Action Code - Denial and the Terminal Action Code - Denial. If the corresponding bit in either of the action codes is set to 1, it indicates that the issuer or the acquirer wishes the transaction to be rejected offline. In this case, the terminal shall issue a GENERATE AC command to request an AAC from the ICC. This AAC may be presented to the issuer to prove card presence during this transaction, but details of handling a rejected transaction are outside the scope of this specification.

If the Issuer Action Code - Online is not present, a default value with all bits set to 1 shall be used in its place. Together, the Issuer Action Code - Online and the Terminal Action Code - Online specify the conditions that cause a transaction to be completed online. These data objects are meaningful only for terminals capable of online processing. Offline-only terminals may skip this test and proceed to checking the Issuer Action Code - Default and Terminal Action Code -Default, described below. For an online-only terminal, if it has not already decided to reject the transaction as described above, it shall continue transaction processing online, and shall issue a GENERATE AC command requesting an ARQC from the card. For a terminal capable of online processing, if the terminal has not already decided to reject the transaction as described above, the terminal shall inspect each bit in the TVR. For each bit in the TVR that has a value of 1, the terminal shall check the corresponding bits in both the Issuer Action Code -Online and the Terminal Action Code - Online. If the bit in either of the action codes is set to 1, the terminal shall complete transaction processing online and shall issue a GENERATE AC command requesting an ARQC from the ICC. Otherwise, the terminal shall issue a GENERATE AC command requesting a TC from the ICC.

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If the Issuer Action Code - Default does not exist, a default value with all bits set to 1 shall be used in its place. Together, the Issuer Action Code - Default and the Terminal Action Code - Default specify the conditions that cause the transaction to be rejected if it might have been approved online but the terminal is for any reason unable to process the transaction online. The Issuer Action Code - Default and the Terminal Action Code - Default are used only if the Issuer Action Code -Online and the Terminal Action Code - Online were not used (for example, in case of an offline-only terminal) or indicated a desire on the part of the issuer or the acquirer to process the transaction online but the terminal was unable to go online. In the event that an online-only terminal was unable to successfully go online, it may optionally skip TAC/IAC Default processing (shown in Figure 7 for a transaction that was not completed on-line) 16. If an online-only terminal does skip TAC/IAC Default processing, it shall request an AAC with the second GENERATE AC command. If the terminal has not already rejected the transaction and the terminal is for any reason unable to process the transaction online, the terminal shall use this code to determine whether to approve or reject the transaction offline. If any bit in Issuer Action Code - Default or the Terminal Action Code - Default and the corresponding bit in the TVR are both set to 1, the transaction shall be rejected and the terminal shall request an AAC to complete processing. If no such condition appears, the transaction may be approved offline, and a GENERATE AC command shall be issued to the ICC requesting a TC.

If CDA is to be performed (as described in section 10.3 of this book and section 6.6 of Book 2), the terminal shall set the bit for 'CDA Signature Requested' in the GENERATE AC command to 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Note that if an online-only terminal is unable to successfully go online and TAC/IAC Default processing is optionally performed, this could result in a TC being requested with the second GENERATE AC command (depending upon the TAC/IAC Default settings).

# 10.8 Card Action Analysis

## **Purpose:**

An ICC may perform its own risk management to protect the issuer from fraud or excessive credit risk. Details of card risk management algorithms within the ICC are specific to the issuer and are outside the scope of this specification, but as a result of the risk management process, an ICC may decide to complete a transaction online or offline or reject the transaction. The ICC may also decide that an advice message should be sent to the issuer to inform the issuer of an exceptional condition.

#### **Conditions of Execution:**

The card online/offline decision is specified by its response to the GENERATE AC command. Therefore, this section applies to all transactions. Whether the ICC performs any risk management tests is transparent to the terminal and outside the scope of this specification.

## **Sequence of Execution:**

The card action analysis process is performed when the terminal issues the GENERATE AC command for a given transaction.

## **Description:**

The result of risk management performed by the ICC is a decision for one of the following actions to be taken by the terminal:

- Approve the transaction offline. This option is available to the ICC only if the terminal has made a preliminary decision to complete the transaction offline, as described in section 10.7.
- Complete the transaction online.
- Reject the transaction.

The decision by the ICC is made known to the terminal by returning a TC, an ARQC, or an AAC to the terminal in response to a GENERATE AC command, as described in section 6.5.5.

Upon the completion of the card action analysis function, the terminal shall set the 'Card risk management was performed' bit in the TSI to 1.

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## 10.8.1 Terminal Messages for an AAC

An AAC returned by the card indicates either a rejection of the specific transaction or a restriction that disallows use of the card in the environment of the transaction (for example, the card application may be restricted only to specific merchant categories). In both cases, the card disapproves the transaction, but the terminal may choose to display different messages in the two cases. The card may optionally distinguish the cases by the use of the code returned in the Cryptogram Information Data (see the GENERATE AC command in section 6.5.5). If an AAC is returned with b3-b1 = '001' in the Cryptogram Information Data, the AAC was returned due to card restrictions.

## 10.8.2 Advice Messages

The issuer may wish for an advice message, separate from either an authorisation request or a clearing message, to be sent in certain exception cases. (Currently, the only identified such case is 'PIN Try Limit exceeded', but allowance has been made for the addition of other cases later; see Table 14).

If b4 of the Cryptogram Information Data is 1, the terminal shall process the transaction as shown in Book 4, sections 6.3.7 and 12.2.5. Further information may be found in complementary payment system documentation.

# 10.9 Online Processing

## **Purpose:**

Online processing is performed to ensure that the issuer can review and authorise or reject transactions that are outside acceptable limits of risk defined by the issuer, the payment system, or the acquirer.

## **Conditions of Execution:**

Online processing shall be performed if the ICC returns an ARQC in response to the first GENERATE AC command for the transaction.

## Sequence of Execution:

The online processing function is performed when the terminal receives an ARQC in response to the first GENERATE AC command.

## **Description:**

In general, online processing is the same as online processing of magnetic stripe transactions and is not described here. This section is limited to the additional online processing provided in an ICC environment that is not available in a magnetic stripe environment.

The ARQC may be sent in the authorisation request message.<sup>17</sup> The authorisation response message from the issuer may contain the Issuer Authentication Data (tag '91'). If the Issuer Authentication Data is received in the authorisation response message and the Application Interchange Profile indicates that the ICC supports issuer authentication, the Issuer Authentication Data shall be sent to the ICC in the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command. If the ICC responds with SW1 SW2 other than '9000', the terminal shall set the 'Issuer authentication failed' bit in the TVR to 1.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Actions performed by the acquirer or issuer systems are outside the scope of this specification. However, an explanation of what is expected to take place at the issuer may be useful for clarity. The ARQC is a cryptogram generated by the card from transaction data using an issuer key stored in the card and known at the issuer authorisation system. The issuer uses this key to authenticate the ARQC and thereby authenticate the card. This process is termed 'online card authentication' or simply 'card authentication'.

Subsequent to card authentication, the issuer may generate a cryptogram on selected data included in the authorisation response or already known to the card. This cryptogram is sent to the terminal in the authorisation response as part of the Issuer Authentication Data. The terminal provides the Issuer Authentication Data to the ICC in the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command or the second GENERATE AC command, as described in Part I. The ICC may use the Issuer Authentication Data to authenticate that the response message originated from the issuer.

If the Issuer Authentication Data is received but the Application Interchange Profile indicates that the ICC does not support issuer authentication, this indicates that the ICC has combined the issuer authentication function with the GENERATE AC command. In this case, or if no Issuer Authentication Data is received, the terminal shall not execute the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.

The ICC shall permit at most one EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command in a transaction. If the terminal issues more than one, the second and all succeeding EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE commands shall end with SW1 SW2 = '6985'.

Upon completion of online processing, if the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command was sent to the card by the terminal, the terminal shall set the 'Issuer authentication was performed' bit in the TSI to 1.

**Note**: Annex F provides additional information about status words to be returned in response to an EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.

# 10.10 Issuer-to-Card Script Processing

## **Purpose:**

An issuer may provide command scripts to be delivered to the ICC by the terminal to perform functions that are not necessarily relevant to the current transaction but are important for the continued functioning of the application in the ICC. Multiple scripts may be provided with an authorisation response, and each may contain any number of Issuer Script Commands. Script processing is provided to allow for functions that are outside the scope of this specification but are nonetheless necessary.<sup>18</sup>

A script may contain Issuer Script Commands not known to the terminal, but the terminal shall deliver each command to the ICC individually according to this specification.

#### **Conditions of Execution:**

None.

## Sequence of Execution:

Two separate script tags are available for use by the issuer. Issuer scripts with tag '71' shall be processed prior to issuing the final GENERATE AC command. Issuer scripts with tag '72' shall be processed after issuing the final GENERATE AC command.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> An example might be unblocking of an offline PIN, which might be done differently by various issuers or payment systems.

## **Description:**

An Issuer Script is a constructed data object (tag '71' or '72') containing (optionally) a Script Identifier and a sequence of Issuer Script Command APDUs to be delivered serially to the ICC. The Script Identifier is optional and is not interpreted by the terminal; it is meaningful only to the issuer. Figure 14 and Figure 15 illustrate an Issuer Script containing a Script Identifier and three commands.

T	L	Т	L	Script ID	Commands
'71' or '72'	L(∑data, including Script ID, tags, and lengths)	'9F18'	'04'	Identifier (4 bytes)	(see Figure 15)

Figure 14: Issuer Script Format

T <sub>1</sub>	L <sub>1</sub>	$V_1$	T <sub>2</sub>	L <sub>2</sub>	$V_2$	T <sub>3</sub>	L <sub>3</sub>	$V_3$
'86'	$L(V_1)$	Command	'86'	$L(V_2)$	Command	'86'	$L(V_3)$	Command

Figure 15: Issuer Script Command Format (Shown with Three Commands)

It is possible for multiple Issuer Scripts to be delivered with a single authorisation response. The terminal shall process each Issuer Script in the sequence in which it appears in the authorisation response according to the following rules:

- Issuer Script Commands shall be separated using the BER-TLV coding of the data objects defining the commands (tag '86').
- Each command shall be delivered to the ICC as a command APDU in the sequence in which it appeared in the Issuer Script.
- The terminal shall examine only SW1 in the response APDU and perform one of the following actions:
  - If SW1 indicates either normal processing or a 'warning' according to the conventions described in this specification, the terminal shall continue with the next command from the Issuer Script (if any).
  - If SW1 indicates an 'error' condition, the processing of the Issuer Script shall be terminated.

If an Issuer Script is processed, the terminal shall set the 'Script processing was performed' bit in the TSI to 1. If an error occurred in processing a script, the terminal shall set to 1 either the 'Script processing failed before final GENERATE AC' in the TVR if the identifying tag of the failing script was '71' or the 'Script processing failed after final GENERATE AC' in the TVR if the tag was '72'.

Note: Annex E discusses TVR and TSI bit settings following script processing.

# 10.11 Completion

## **Purpose:**

The completion function closes processing of a transaction.

#### **Conditions of Execution:**

The terminal always performs this function unless the transaction is terminated prematurely by error processing.

## Sequence of Execution:

The completion function is always the last function in the transaction processing. (Script processing may be performed after the completion function.)

## **Description:**

The ICC indicates willingness to complete transaction processing by returning either a TC or an AAC to either the first or second GENERATE AC command issued by the terminal. If the terminal decides to go online, completion shall be done when the second GENERATE AC command is issued.

If the terminal is to perform CDA (as described in section 10.3), the terminal shall set the 'CDA signature requested' bit in the GENERATE AC command to 1.

See section 9 for additional information on the use of the GENERATE AC command.

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# Part IV Annexes

# **Annex A** Data Elements Dictionary

Table 33 defines those data elements that may be used for financial transaction interchange and their mapping onto data objects and files. Table 34 lists the data elements in tag sequence.

The characters used in the "Format" column are described in section 4.3, Data Element Format Convention.

# A1 Data Elements by Name

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Account Type	Indicates the type of account selected on the terminal, coded as specified in Annex G	Terminal	n 2	_	'5F57'	1
Acquirer Identifier	Uniquely identifies the acquirer within each payment system	Terminal	n 6-11	_	'9F01'	6
Additional Terminal Capabilities	Indicates the data input and output capabilities of the terminal	Terminal	b	_	'9F40'	5
Amount, Authorised (Binary)	Authorised amount of the transaction (excluding adjustments)	Terminal	b	_	'81'	4

**Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary** 

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Amount, Authorised (Numeric)	Authorised amount of the transaction (excluding adjustments)	Terminal	n 12	_	'9F02'	6
Amount, Other (Binary)	Secondary amount associated with the transaction representing a cashback amount	Terminal	b	_	'9F04'	4
Amount, Other (Numeric)	Secondary amount associated with the transaction representing a cashback amount	Terminal	n 12	_	'9F03'	6
Amount, Reference Currency	Authorised amount expressed in the reference currency	Terminal	b	_	'9F3A'	4
Application Cryptogram	Cryptogram returned by the ICC in response of the GENERATE AC command	ICC	b	'77' or '80'	'9F26'	8
Application Currency Code	Indicates the currency in which the account is managed according to ISO 4217	ICC	n 3	'70' or '77'	'9F42'	2
Application Currency Exponent	Indicates the implied position of the decimal point from the right of the amount represented according to ISO 4217	ICC	n 1	'70' or '77'	'9F44'	1
Application Discretionary Data	Issuer or payment system specified data relating to the application	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F05'	1-32
Application Effective Date	Date from which the application may be used	ICC	n 6 YYMMDD	'70' or '77'	'5F25'	3

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Application Expiration Date	Date after which application expires	ICC	n 6 YYMMDD	'70' or '77'	'5F24'	3
Application File Locator (AFL)	Indicates the location (SFI, range of records) of the AEFs related to a given application	ICC	var.	'77' or '80'	'94'	var. up to 252
Application Dedicated File (ADF) Name	Identifies the application as described in ISO/IEC 7816-5	ICC	b	'61'	'4F'	5-16
Application Identifier (AID) – terminal	Identifies the application as described in ISO/IEC 7816-5	Terminal	b	_	'9F06'	5-16
Application Interchange Profile	Indicates the capabilities of the card to support specific functions in the application	ICC	b	'77' or '80'	'82'	2
Application Label	Mnemonic associated with the AID according to ISO/IEC 7816-5	ICC	ans with the special character limited to space	'61' or 'A5'	'50'	1-16
Application Preferred Name	Preferred mnemonic associated with the AID	ICC	ans (see section 4.3)	'61' or 'A5'	'9F12'	1-16
Application Primary Account Number (PAN)	Valid cardholder account number	ICC	cn var. up to 19	'70' or '77'	'5A'	var. up to 10

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Application Primary Account Number (PAN) Sequence Number	Identifies and differentiates cards with the same PAN	ICC	n 2	'70' or '77'	'5F34'	1
Application Priority Indicator	Indicates the priority of a given application or group of applications in a directory	ICC	b	'61' or 'A5'	'87'	1
Application Reference Currency	1-4 currency codes used between the terminal and the ICC when the Transaction Currency Code is different from the Application Currency Code; each code is 3 digits according to ISO 4217	ICC	n 3	'70' or '77'	'9F3B'	2-8
Application Reference Currency Exponent	Indicates the implied position of the decimal point from the right of the amount, for each of the 1-4 reference currencies represented according to ISO 4217	ICC	n 1	'70' or '77'	'9F43'	1-4

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Application Selection Indicator	For an application in the ICC to be supported by an application in the terminal, the Application Selection Indicator indicates whether the associated AID in the terminal must match the AID in the card exactly, including the length of the AID, or only up to the length of the AID in the terminal There is only one Application Selection Indicator per AID supported by the terminal	Terminal	At the discretion of the terminal. The data is not sent across the interface	_		See format
Application Template	Contains one or more data objects relevant to an application directory entry according to ISO/IEC 7816-5	ICC	b	'70'	'61'	var. up to 252
Application Transaction Counter (ATC)	Counter maintained by the application in the ICC (incrementing the ATC is managed by the ICC)	ICC	b	'77' or '80'	'9F36'	2
Application Usage Control	Indicates issuer's specified restrictions on the geographic usage and services allowed for the application	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F07'	2
Application Version Number	Version number assigned by the payment system for the application	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F08'	2
Application Version Number	Version number assigned by the payment system for the application	Terminal	b	_	'9F09'	2

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Authorisation Code	Value generated by the authorisation authority for an approved transaction	Issuer	As defined by the Payment Systems	_	'89'	6
Authorisation Response Code	Code that defines the disposition of a message	Issuer/ Terminal	an 2	_	'8A'	2
Authorisation Response Cryptogram (ARPC)	Cryptogram generated by the issuer and used by the card to verify that the response came from the issuer.	Issuer	b	_	_	4 or 8
Bank Identifier Code (BIC)	Uniquely identifies a bank as defined in ISO 9362.	ICC	var.	'BF0C' or '73'	'5F54'	8 or 11
Card Risk Management Data Object List 1 (CDOL1)	List of data objects (tag and length) to be passed to the ICC in the first GENERATE AC command	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'8C'	var. up to 252
Card Risk Management Data Object List 2 (CDOL2)	List of data objects (tag and length) to be passed to the ICC in the second GENERATE AC command	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'8D'	var. up to 252

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Card Status Update (CSU)	Contains data sent to the ICC to indicate whether the issuer approves or declines the transaction, and to initiate actions specified by the issuer. Transmitted to the card in Issuer Authentication Data.	Issuer	b	_	_	4
Cardholder Name	Indicates cardholder name according to ISO 7813	ICC	ans 2-26	'70' or '77'	'5F20'	2-26
Cardholder Name Extended	Indicates the whole cardholder name when greater than 26 characters using the same coding convention as in ISO 7813	ICC	ans 27-45	'70' or '77'	'9F0B'	27-45
Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) List	Identifies a method of verification of the cardholder supported by the application	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'8E'	10-252
Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) Results	Indicates the results of the last CVM performed	Terminal	b	_	'9F34'	3
Certification Authority Public Key Check Sum	A check value calculated on the concatenation of all parts of the Certification Authority Public Key (RID, Certification Authority Public Key Index, Certification Authority Public Key Modulus, Certification Authority Public Key Exponent) using SHA-1	Terminal	b	_	_	20

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Certification Authority Public Key Exponent	Value of the exponent part of the Certification Authority Public Key	Terminal	b	_	_	1 or 3
Certification Authority Public Key Index	Identifies the certification authority's public key in conjunction with the RID	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'8F'	1
Certification Authority Public Key Index	Identifies the certification authority's public key in conjunction with the RID	Terminal	b	_	'9F22'	1
Certification Authority Public Key Modulus	Value of the modulus part of the Certification Authority Public Key	Terminal	b	_	_	NCA (up to 248)
Command Template	Identifies the data field of a command message	Terminal	b	_	'83'	var.
Cryptogram Information Data	Indicates the type of cryptogram and the actions to be performed by the terminal	ICC	b	'77' or '80'	'9F27'	1
Data Authentication Code	An issuer assigned value that is retained by the terminal during the verification process of the Signed Static Application Data	ICC	b	_	'9F45'	2
Dedicated File (DF) Name	Identifies the name of the DF as described in ISO/IEC 7816-4	ICC	b	'6F'	'84'	5-16

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Default Dynamic Data Authentication Data Object List (DDOL)	DDOL to be used for constructing the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command if the DDOL in the card is not present	Terminal	b	_	_	var.
Default Transaction Certificate Data Object List (TDOL)	TDOL to be used for generating the TC Hash Value if the TDOL in the card is not present	Terminal	b	_	_	var.
Directory Definition File (DDF) Name	Identifies the name of a DF associated with a directory	ICC	b	'61'	'9D'	5-16
Directory Discretionary Template	Issuer discretionary part of the directory according to ISO/IEC 7816-5	ICC	var.	'61'	'73'	var. up to 252
Dynamic Data Authentication Data Object List (DDOL)	List of data objects (tag and length) to be passed to the ICC in the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F49'	up to 252
Enciphered Personal Identification Number (PIN) Data	Transaction PIN enciphered at the PIN pad for online verification or for offline verification if the PIN pad and IFD are not a single integrated device	Terminal	b	_	_	8

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
File Control Information (FCI) Issuer Discretionary Data	Issuer discretionary part of the FCI	ICC	var.	'A5'	'BF0C'	var. up to 222
File Control Information (FCI) Proprietary Template	Identifies the data object proprietary to this specification in the FCI template according to ISO/IEC 7816-4	ICC	var.	'6F'	'A5'	var.
File Control Information (FCI) Template	Identifies the FCI template according to ISO/IEC 7816-4	ICC	var.	_	'6F'	var. up to 252
ICC Dynamic Number	Time-variant number generated by the ICC, to be captured by the terminal	ICC	b	_	'9F4C'	2-8
Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) PIN Encipherment Public Key Certificate	ICC PIN Encipherment Public Key certified by the issuer	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F2D'	NI

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) PIN Encipherment Public Key Exponent	ICC PIN Encipherment Public Key Exponent used for PIN encipherment	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F2E'	1 or 3
Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) PIN Encipherment Public Key Remainder	Remaining digits of the ICC PIN Encipherment Public Key Modulus	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F2F'	NPE – NI + 42
Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) Public Key Certificate	ICC Public Key certified by the issuer	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F46'	NI
Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) Public Key Exponent	ICC Public Key Exponent used for the verification of the Signed Dynamic Application Data	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F47'	1 to 3
Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) Public Key Remainder	Remaining digits of the ICC Public Key Modulus	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F48'	NIC - NI + 42

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Interface Device (IFD) Serial Number	Unique and permanent serial number assigned to the IFD by the manufacturer	Terminal	an 8	_	'9F1E'	8
International Bank Account Number (IBAN)	Uniquely identifies the account of a customer at a financial institution as defined in ISO 13616.	ICC	var.	'BF0C' or '73'	'5F53'	Var. up to 34
Issuer Action Code - Default	Specifies the issuer's conditions that cause a transaction to be rejected if it might have been approved online, but the terminal is unable to process the transaction online	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F0D'	5
Issuer Action Code - Denial	Specifies the issuer's conditions that cause the denial of a transaction without attempt to go online	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F0E'	5
Issuer Action Code - Online	Specifies the issuer's conditions that cause a transaction to be transmitted online	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F0F'	5
Issuer Application Data	Contains proprietary application data for transmission to the issuer in an online transaction.  Note: For CCD-compliant applications, Annex C, section C7 defines the specific coding of the Issuer Application Data (IAD). To avoid potential conflicts with CCD-compliant applications, it is strongly recommended that the IAD data element in an application that is not CCD-compliant should not use the coding for a CCD-compliant application	ICC	b	'77' or '80'	'9F10'	var. up to 32

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Issuer Authentication Data	Data sent to the ICC for online issuer authentication	Issuer	b	_	'91'	8-16
Issuer Code Table Index	Indicates the code table according to ISO/IEC 8859 for displaying the Application Preferred Name	ICC	n 2	'A5'	'9F11'	1
Issuer Country Code	Indicates the country of the issuer according to ISO 3166	ICC	n 3	'70' or '77'	'5F28'	2
Issuer Country Code (alpha2 format)	Indicates the country of the issuer as defined in ISO 3166 (using a 2 character alphabetic code)	ICC	a 2	'BF0C' or '73'	'5F55'	2
Issuer Country Code (alpha3 format)	Indicates the country of the issuer as defined in ISO 3166 (using a 3 character alphabetic code)	ICC	a 3	'BF0C' or '73'	'5F56'	3
Issuer Identification Number (IIN)	The number that identifies the major industry and the card issuer and that forms the first part of the Primary Account Number (PAN)	ICC	n 6	'BF0C' or '73'	'42'	3
Issuer Public Key Certificate	Issuer public key certified by a certification authority	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'90'	NCA
Issuer Public Key Exponent	Issuer public key exponent used for the verification of the Signed Static Application Data and the ICC Public Key Certificate	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F32'	1 to 3

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Issuer Public Key Remainder	Remaining digits of the Issuer Public Key Modulus	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'92'	NI – NCA + 36
Issuer Script Command	Contains a command for transmission to the ICC	Issuer	b	'71' or '72'	'86'	var. up to 261
Issuer Script Identifier	Identification of the Issuer Script	Issuer	b	'71' or '72'	'9F18'	4
Issuer Script Results	Indicates the result of the terminal script processing	Terminal	b	_	_	var.
Issuer Script Template 1	Contains proprietary issuer data for transmission to the ICC before the second GENERATE AC command	Issuer	b	_	'71'	var.
Issuer Script Template 2	Contains proprietary issuer data for transmission to the ICC after the second GENERATE AC command	Issuer	b	_	'72'	var.
Issuer URL	The URL provides the location of the Issuer's Library Server on the Internet.	ICC	ans	'BF0C' or '73'	'5F50'	var.
Language Preference	1-4 languages stored in order of preference, each represented by 2 alphabetical characters according to ISO 639  Note: EMVCo strongly recommends that cards be personalised with data element '5F2D' coded in lowercase, but that terminals accept the data element whether it is coded in upper or lower case.	ICC	an 2	'A5'	'5F2D'	2-8

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Last Online Application Transaction Counter (ATC) Register	ATC value of the last transaction that went online	ICC	b	_	'9F13'	2
Log Entry	Provides the SFI of the Transaction Log file and its number of records	ICC	b	'BF0C' or '73'	'9F4D'	2
Log Format	List (in tag and length format) of data objects representing the logged data elements that are passed to the terminal when a transaction log record is read	ICC	b	_	'9F4F'	var.
Lower Consecutive Offline Limit	Issuer-specified preference for the maximum number of consecutive offline transactions for this ICC application allowed in a terminal with online capability	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F14'	1
Maximum Target Percentage to be used for Biased Random Selection	Value used in terminal risk management for random transaction selection	Terminal	_	_	_	_
Merchant Category Code	Classifies the type of business being done by the merchant, represented according to ISO 8583:1993 for Card Acceptor Business Code	Terminal	n 4	_	'9F15'	2

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Merchant Identifier	When concatenated with the Acquirer Identifier, uniquely identifies a given merchant	Terminal	ans 15	_	'9F16'	15
Merchant Name and Location	Indicates the name and location of the merchant	Terminal	ans	_	'9F4E'	var.
Message Type	Indicates whether the batch data capture record is a financial record or advice	Terminal	n 2	_		1
Personal Identification Number (PIN) Pad Secret Key	Secret key of a symmetric algorithm used by the PIN pad to encipher the PIN and by the card reader to decipher the PIN if the PIN pad and card reader are not integrated	Terminal	_	_	_	
Personal Identification Number (PIN) Try Counter	Number of PIN tries remaining	ICC	b	_	'9F17'	1
Point-of-Service (POS) Entry Mode	Indicates the method by which the PAN was entered, according to the first two digits of the ISO 8583:1987 POS Entry Mode	Terminal	n 2	_	'9F39'	1
Processing Options Data Object List (PDOL)	Contains a list of terminal resident data objects (tags and lengths) needed by the ICC in processing the GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command	ICC	b	'A5'	'9F38'	var.
Proprietary Authentication Data	Contains issuer data for transmission to the card in the Issuer Authentication Data of an online transaction.	Issuer	b	_	_	var. up to 8

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
READ RECORD Response Message Template	Contains the contents of the record read. (Mandatory for SFIs 1-10. Response messages for SFIs 11-30 are outside the scope of EMV, but may use template '70')	ICC	var.	_	'70'	var. up to 252
Response Message Template Format 1	Contains the data objects (without tags and lengths) returned by the ICC in response to a command	ICC	var.	_	'80'	var.
Response Message Template Format 2	Contains the data objects (with tags and lengths) returned by the ICC in response to a command	ICC	var.	_	'77'	var.
Service Code	Service code as defined in ISO/IEC 7813 for track 1 and track 2	ICC	n 3	'70' or '77'	'5F30'	2
Short File Identifier (SFI)	Identifies the AEF referenced in commands related to a given ADF or DDF. It is a binary data object having a value in the range 1 to 30 and with the three high order bits set to zero.	ICC	b	'A5'	'88'	1
Signed Dynamic Application Data	Digital signature on critical application parameters for DDA or CDA	ICC	b	'77' or '80'	'9F4B'	NIC
Signed Static Application Data	Digital signature on critical application parameters for SDA	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'93'	NI

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Static Data Authentication Tag List	List of tags of primitive data objects defined in this specification whose value fields are to be included in the Signed Static or Dynamic Application Data	ICC	_	'70' or '77'	'9F4A'	var.
Target Percentage to be Used for Random Selection	Value used in terminal risk management for random transaction selection	Terminal	_	_	_	
Terminal Action Code - Default	Specifies the acquirer's conditions that cause a transaction to be rejected if it might have been approved online, but the terminal is unable to process the transaction online	Terminal	b	_	_	5
Terminal Action Code - Denial	Specifies the acquirer's conditions that cause the denial of a transaction without attempt to go online	Terminal	b	_	_	5
Terminal Action Code - Online	Specifies the acquirer's conditions that cause a transaction to be transmitted online	Terminal	b	_	_	5
Terminal Capabilities	Indicates the card data input, CVM, and security capabilities of the terminal	Terminal	b	_	'9F33'	3
Terminal Country Code	Indicates the country of the terminal, represented according to ISO 3166	Terminal	n 3	_	'9F1A'	2
Terminal Floor Limit	Indicates the floor limit in the terminal in conjunction with the AID	Terminal	b	_	'9F1B'	4

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Terminal Identification	Designates the unique location of a terminal at a merchant	Terminal	an 8	_	'9F1C'	8
Terminal Risk Management Data	Application-specific value used by the card for risk management purposes	Terminal	b	_	'9F1D'	1-8
Terminal Type	Indicates the environment of the terminal, its communications capability, and its operational control	Terminal	n 2	_	'9F35'	1
Terminal Verification Results	Status of the different functions as seen from the terminal	Terminal	b	_	'95'	5
Threshold Value for Biased Random Selection	Value used in terminal risk management for random transaction selection	Terminal	_	_	_	_
Track 1 Discretionary Data	Discretionary part of track 1 according to ISO/IEC 7813	ICC	ans	'70' or '77'	'9F1F'	var.
Track 2 Discretionary Data	Discretionary part of track 2 according to ISO/IEC 7813	ICC	cn	'70' or '77'	'9F20'	var.

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Track 2 Equivalent Data	Contains the data elements of track 2 according to ISO/IEC 7813, excluding start sentinel, end sentinel, and Longitudinal Redundancy Check (LRC), as follows:	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'57'	var. up to 19
	Primary Account Number		n, var. up to 19			
	Field Separator (Hex 'D')		b			
	Expiration Date (YYMM)		n 4			
	Service Code		n 3			
	Discretionary Data (defined by individual payment systems)		n, var.			
	Pad with one Hex 'F' if needed to ensure whole bytes		b			
Transaction Amount	Clearing amount of the transaction, including tips and other adjustments	Terminal	n 12	_		6
Transaction Certificate Data Object List (TDOL)	List of data objects (tag and length) to be used by the terminal in generating the TC Hash Value	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'97'	var. up to 252
Transaction Certificate (TC) Hash Value	Result of a hash function specified in Book 2, Annex B3.1	Terminal	b	_	'98'	20

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Transaction Currency Code	Indicates the currency code of the transaction according to ISO 4217	Terminal	n 3	_	'5F2A'	2
Transaction Currency Exponent	Indicates the implied position of the decimal point from the right of the transaction amount represented according to ISO 4217	Terminal	n 1	_	'5F36'	1
Transaction Date	Local date that the transaction was authorised	Terminal	n 6 YYMMDD	_	'9A'	3
Transaction Personal Identification Number (PIN) Data	Data entered by the cardholder for the purpose of the PIN verification	Terminal	b	_	'99'	var.
Transaction Reference Currency Code	Code defining the common currency used by the terminal in case the Transaction Currency Code is different from the Application Currency Code	Terminal	n 3	_	'9F3C'	2
Transaction Reference Currency Conversion	Factor used in the conversion from the Transaction Currency Code to the Transaction Reference Currency Code	Terminal	n 8	_	_	4
Transaction Reference Currency Exponent	Indicates the implied position of the decimal point from the right of the transaction amount, with the Transaction Reference Currency Code represented according to ISO 4217	Terminal	n 1	_	'9F3D'	1

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

Name	Description	Source	Format	Template	Tag	Length
Transaction Sequence Counter	Counter maintained by the terminal that is incremented by one for each transaction	Terminal	n 4-8	_	'9F41'	2-4
Transaction Status Information	Indicates the functions performed in a transaction	Terminal	b	_	'9B'	2
Transaction Time	Local time that the transaction was authorised	Terminal	n 6 HHMMSS	_	'9F21'	3
Transaction Type	Indicates the type of financial transaction, represented by the first two digits of the ISO 8583:1987 Processing Code. The actual values to be used for the Transaction Type data element are defined by the relevant payment system	Terminal	n 2	_	'9C'	1
Unpredictable Number	Value to provide variability and uniqueness to the generation of a cryptogram	Terminal	b	_	'9F37'	4
Upper Consecutive Offline Limit	Issuer-specified preference for the maximum number of consecutive offline transactions for this ICC application allowed in a terminal without online capability	ICC	b	'70' or '77'	'9F23'	1

Table 33: Data Elements Dictionary, continued

When the length defined for the data object is greater than the length of the actual data, the following rules apply:

- A data element in format n is right justified and padded with leading hexadecimal zeroes.
- A data element in format cn is left justified and padded with trailing hexadecimal 'F's.
- A data element in format a, an, or ans is left justified and padded with trailing hexadecimal zeroes.

When data is moved from one entity to another (for example, card to terminal), it shall always be passed in order from high order to low order, regardless of how it is internally stored. The same rule applies when concatenating data.

**Note:** Data that can occur in template '70' or '77' can never occur in both.

## A2 Data Elements by Tag

Name	Template	Tag
Issuer Identification Number (IIN)	'BF0C' or '73'	'42'
Application Dedicated File (ADF) Name	'61'	'4F'
Application Label	'61' or 'A5'	'50'
Track 2 Equivalent Data	'70' or '77'	'57'
Application Primary Account Number (PAN)	'70' or '77'	'5A'
Cardholder Name	'70' or '77'	'5F20'
Application Expiration Date	'70' or '77'	'5F24'
Application Effective Date	'70' or '77'	'5F25'
Issuer Country Code	'70' or '77'	'5F28'
Transaction Currency Code	_	'5F2A'
Language Preference	'A5'	'5F2D'
Service Code	'70' or '77'	'5F30'
Application Primary Account Number (PAN) Sequence Number	'70' or '77'	'5F34'
Transaction Currency Exponent	_	'5F36'
Issuer URL	'BF0C' or '73'	'5F50'
International Bank Account Number (IBAN)	'BF0C' or '73'	'5F53'
Bank Identifier Code (BIC)	'BF0C' or '73'	'5F54'
Issuer Country Code (alpha2 format)	'BF0C' or '73'	'5F55'
Issuer Country Code (alpha3 format)	'BF0C' or '73'	'5F56'
Account Type	_	'5F57'
Application Template	'70' or '77'	'61'
File Control Information (FCI) Template	_	'6F'

**Table 34: Data Elements Tags** 

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Name	Template	Tag
READ RECORD Response Message Template	_	'70'
Issuer Script Template 1	_	'71'
Issuer Script Template 2	_	'72'
Directory Discretionary Template	'61'	'73'
Response Message Template Format 2	_	'77'
Response Message Template Format 1	<u>—</u>	'80'
Amount, Authorised (Binary)	<u>—</u>	'81'
Application Interchange Profile	'77' or '80'	'82'
Command Template	_	'83'
Dedicated File (DF) Name	'6F'	'84'
Issuer Script Command	'71' or '72'	'86'
Application Priority Indicator	'61' or 'A5'	'87'
Short File Identifier (SFI)	'A5'	'88'
Authorisation Code	_	'89'
Authorisation Response Code	_	'8A'
Card Risk Management Data Object List 1 (CDOL1)	'70' or '77'	'8C'
Card Risk Management Data Object List 2 (CDOL2)	'70' or '77'	'8D'
Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) List	'70' or '77'	'8E'
Certification Authority Public Key Index	'70' or '77'	'8F'
Issuer Public Key Certificate	'70' or '77'	'90'
Issuer Authentication Data	_	'91'
Issuer Public Key Remainder	'70' or '77'	'92'
Signed Static Application Data	'70' or '77'	'93'
Application File Locator (AFL)	'77' or '80'	'94'
Terminal Verification Results	_	'95'
Transaction Certificate Data Object List (TDOL)	'70' or '77'	'97'
Transaction Certificate (TC) Hash Value	_	'98'
Transaction Personal Identification Number (PIN) Data	_	'99'

Table 34: Data Elements Tags, continued

Name	Template	Tag
Transaction Date	_	'9A'
Transaction Status Information	_	'9B'
Transaction Type	_	'9C'
Directory Definition File (DDF) Name	'61'	'9D'
Acquirer Identifier	_	'9F01'
Amount, Authorised (Numeric)	_	'9F02'
Amount, Other (Numeric)	_	'9F03'
Amount, Other (Binary)	_	'9F04'
Application Discretionary Data	'70' or '77'	'9F05'
Application Identifier (AID) - terminal	_	'9F06'
Application Usage Control	'70' or '77'	'9F07'
Application Version Number	'70' or '77'	'9F08'
Application Version Number	_	'9F09'
Cardholder Name Extended	'70' or '77'	'9F0B'
Issuer Action Code - Default	'70' or '77'	'9F0D'
Issuer Action Code - Denial	'70' or '77'	'9F0E'
Issuer Action Code - Online	'70' or '77'	'9F0F'
Issuer Application Data	'77' or '80'	'9F10'
Issuer Code Table Index	'A5'	'9F11'
Application Preferred Name	'61' or 'A5'	'9F12'
Last Online Application Transaction Counter (ATC) Register	_	'9F13'
Lower Consecutive Offline Limit	'70' or '77'	'9F14'
Merchant Category Code	_	'9F15'
Merchant Identifier	_	'9F16'
Personal Identification Number (PIN) Try Counter	_	'9F17'
Issuer Script Identifier	'71' or '72'	'9F18'

Table 34: Data Elements Tags, continued

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Name	Template	Tag
Terminal Country Code	_	'9F1A'
Terminal Floor Limit	_	'9F1B'
Terminal Identification	_	'9F1C'
Terminal Risk Management Data	_	'9F1D'
Interface Device (IFD) Serial Number	_	'9F1E'
Track 1 Discretionary Data	'70' or '77'	'9F1F'
Track 2 Discretionary Data	'70' or '77'	'9F20'
Transaction Time	_	'9F21'
Certification Authority Public Key Index	_	'9F22'
Upper Consecutive Offline Limit	'70' or '77'	'9F23'
Application Cryptogram	'77' or '80'	'9F26'
Cryptogram Information Data	'77' or '80'	'9F27'
ICC PIN Encipherment Public Key Certificate	'70' or '77'	'9F2D'
ICC PIN Encipherment Public Key Exponent	'70' or '77'	'9F2E'
ICC PIN Encipherment Public Key Remainder	'70' or '77'	'9F2F'
Issuer Public Key Exponent	'70' or '77'	'9F32'
Terminal Capabilities	_	'9F33'
Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) Results	_	'9F34'
Terminal Type	_	'9F35'
Application Transaction Counter (ATC)	'77' or '80'	'9F36'
Unpredictable Number	_	'9F37'
Processing Options Data Object List (PDOL)	'A5'	'9F38'
Point-of-Service (POS) Entry Mode	_	'9F39'
Amount, Reference Currency	_	'9F3A'
Application Reference Currency	'70' or '77'	'9F3B'
Transaction Reference Currency Code		'9F3C'
Transaction Reference Currency Exponent		'9F3D'
Additional Terminal Capabilities	_	'9F40'
Transaction Sequence Counter	_	'9F41'

Table 34: Data Elements Tags, continued

Name	Template	Tag
Application Currency Code	'70' or '77'	'9F42'
Application Reference Currency Exponent	'70' or '77'	'9F43'
Application Currency Exponent	'70' or '77'	'9F44'
Data Authentication Code	_	'9F45'
ICC Public Key Certificate	'70' or '77'	'9F46'
ICC Public Key Exponent	'70' or '77'	'9F47'
ICC Public Key Remainder	'70' or '77'	'9F48'
Dynamic Data Authentication Data Object List (DDOL)	'70' or '77'	'9F49'
Static Data Authentication Tag List	'70' or '77'	'9F4A'
Signed Dynamic Application Data	'77' or '80'	'9F4B'
ICC Dynamic Number		'9F4C'
Log Entry	'BF0C' or '73'	'9F4D'
Merchant Name and Location	_	'9F4E'
Log Format		'9F4F'
File Control Information (FCI) Proprietary Template	'6F'	'A5'
File Control Information (FCI) Issuer Discretionary Data	'A5'	'BF0C'

Table 34: Data Elements Tags, continued

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## **Annex B** Rules for BER-TLV Data Objects

As defined in ISO/IEC 8825, a BER-TLV data object consists of 2-3 consecutive fields:

- The tag field (T) consists of one or more consecutive bytes. It indicates a class, a type, and a number (see Table 35). The tag field of the data objects described in this specification is coded on one or two bytes.
- The length field (L) consists of one or more consecutive bytes. It indicates the length of the following field. The length field of the data objects described in this specification which are transmitted over the card-terminal interface is coded on one or two bytes.

**Note:** Three length bytes may be used if needed for templates '71' and '72' and tag '86' (to express length greater than 255 bytes), as they are not transmitted over the card-terminal interface.

• The value field (V) indicates the value of the data object. If L = '00', the value field is not present.

A BER-TLV data object belongs to one of the following two categories:

- A primitive data object where the value field contains a data element for financial transaction interchange.
- A constructed data object where the value field contains one or more primitive or constructed data objects. The value field of a constructed data object is called a template.

The coding of BER-TLV data objects is defined as follows.

# B1 Coding of the Tag Field of BER-TLV Data Objects

Table 35 describes the first byte of the tag field of a BER-TLV data object:

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
0	0		-		-			Universal class
0	1							Application class
1	0							Context-specific class
1	1							Private class
		0						Primitive data object
		1						Constructed data object
			1	1	1	1	1	See subsequent bytes
	Any other value <31				ner va	31	Tag number	

Table 35: Tag Field Structure (First Byte) BER-TLV

According to ISO/IEC 8825, Table 36 defines the coding rules of the subsequent bytes of a BER-TLV tag when tag numbers  $\geq$  31 are used (that is, bits b5 - b1 of the first byte equal '11111').

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
1								Another byte follows
0								Last tag byte
	Any value > 0						(Part of) tag number	

Table 36: Tag Field Structure (Subsequent Bytes) BER-TLV

Before, between, or after TLV-coded data objects, '00' bytes without any meaning may occur (for example, due to erased or modified TLV-coded data objects).

**Note:** It is strongly recommended that issuers do not use tags beginning with 'FF' for proprietary purposes, as existing terminals may not recognise 'FF' as the beginning of a constructed private class tag.

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The tag field of a BER-TLV data object is coded according to the following rules:

- The following application class templates defined in ISO/IEC 7816 apply: '61' and '6F'.
- The following range of application class templates is defined in Part II: '70' to '7F'. The meaning is then specific to the context of an application according to this specification. Tags '78', '79', '7D', and '7E' are defined in ISO/IEC 7816-6 and are not used in this specification.
- The application class data objects defined in ISO/IEC 7816 and described in Part II are used according to the ISO/IEC 7816 definition.
- Context-specific class data objects are defined in the context of this specification or in the context of the template in which they appear.
- The coding of primitive context-specific class data objects in the ranges '80' to '9E' and '9F00' to '9F4F' is reserved for this specification.
- The coding of primitive context-specific class data objects in the range '9F50' to '9F7F' is reserved for the payment systems.
- The coding of tag 'BF0C' and constructed context-specific class data objects in the range 'BF20' to 'BF4F' is reserved for this specification.
- The coding of constructed context-specific class data objects in the ranges 'BF10' to 'BF1F' and 'BF50' to 'BF6F' is reserved for the payment systems.
- The coding of constructed context-specific class data objects in the ranges 'BF01' to 'BF0B', 'BF0D' to 'BF0F', and 'BF70' to 'BF7F' is left to the discretion of the issuer.
- The coding of primitive and constructed private class data objects is left to the discretion of the issuer.

# B2 Coding of the Length Field of BER-TLV Data Objects

When bit b8 of the most significant byte of the length field is set to 0, the length field consists of only one byte. Bits b7 to b1 code the number of bytes of the value field. The length field is within the range 1 to 127.

When bit b8 of the most significant byte of the length field is set to 1, the subsequent bits b7 to b1 of the most significant byte code the number of subsequent bytes in the length field. The subsequent bytes code an integer representing the number of bytes in the value field. Two bytes are necessary to express up to 255 bytes in the value field.

### **B3** Coding of the Value Field of Data Objects

A data element is the value field (V) of a primitive BER-TLV data object. A data element is the smallest data field that receives an identifier (a tag).

A primitive data object is structured as illustrated in Figure 16:




Figure 16: Primitive BER-TLV Data Object (Data Element)

A constructed BER-TLV data object consists of a tag, a length, and a value field composed of one or more BER-TLV data objects. A record in an AEF governed by this specification is a constructed BER-TLV data object. A constructed data object is structured as illustrated in Figure 17:

Tag (T)	Length (L)	Primitive or constructed BER-TLV data object	•••	Primitive or constructed BER-TLV data object
	, ,	number 1		number n

Figure 17: Constructed BER-TLV Data Object

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## Annex C Coding of Data Elements Used in Transaction Processing

This annex provides the coding for dynamic card data elements and specific data elements used to control the transaction flow in the terminal or to record the status of processing for the transaction. In the tables:

- A '1' means that if that bit has the value 1, the corresponding 'Meaning' applies.
- An 'x' means that the bit does not apply.

Data (bytes or bits) indicated as RFU shall be set to 0.

## C1 Application Interchange Profile

#### AIP Byte 1 (Leftmost)

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
0	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	RFU
Х	1	х	Х	Х	х	х	Х	SDA supported
Х	Х	1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	DDA supported
х	Х	Х	1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Cardholder verification is supported
х	Х	Х	Х	1	Х	Х	Х	Terminal risk management is to be performed
х	Х	Х	Х	Х	1	Х	Х	Issuer authentication is supported <sup>19</sup>
Х	х	х	х	х	х	0	х	RFU
Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	1	CDA supported

#### AIP Byte 2 (Rightmost)

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
0	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Reserved for use by the EMV Contactless Specifications
Х	0	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	RFU
Х	Х	0	Х	Х	Х	Х	х	RFU
Х	х	Х	0	Х	Х	х	х	RFU
Х	х	Х	Х	0	Х	х	х	RFU
Х	х	Х	Х	Х	0	х	х	RFU
Х	х	Х	Х	Х	Х	0	х	RFU
Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	0	RFU

**Table 37: Application Interchange Profile** 

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 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 19}$  When this bit is set to 1, Issuer Authentication using the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command is supported

## **C2** Application Usage Control

#### **Application Usage Control Byte 1 (Leftmost)**

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
1	Х	Х	Х	Х	х	Х	х	Valid for domestic cash transactions
х	1	Х	Х	Х	х	Х	х	Valid for international cash transactions
х	х	1	х	Х	х	Х	х	Valid for domestic goods
х	х	х	1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Valid for international goods
х	х	х	х	1	х	Х	Х	Valid for domestic services
х	х	х	х	Х	1	Х	Х	Valid for international services
х	х	х	х	Х	х	1	Х	Valid at ATMs
х	Х	Х	Х	Х	х	Х	1	Valid at terminals other than ATMs

#### **Application Usage Control Byte 2 (Rightmost)**

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
1	х	х	х	х	х	х	х	Domestic cashback allowed
х	1	х	х	х	Х	х	Х	International cashback allowed
х	х	0	х	х	Х	х	Х	RFU
х	х	х	0	х	Х	х	Х	RFU
х	х	х	х	0	Х	х	Х	RFU
х	х	х	х	х	0	х	Х	RFU
х	Х	х	Х	Х	Х	0	Х	RFU
х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	0	RFU

**Table 38: Application Usage Control** 

### **C3** Cardholder Verification Rule Format

#### CV Rule Byte 1 (Leftmost): Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) Codes

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
0								RFU
	0							Fail cardholder verification if this CVM is unsuccessful
	1							Apply succeeding CV Rule if this CVM is unsuccessful
		0	0	0	0	0	0	Fail CVM processing
		0	0	0	0	0	1	Plaintext PIN verification performed by ICC
		0	0	0	0	1	0	Enciphered PIN verified online
		0	0	0	0	1	1	Plaintext PIN verification performed by ICC and signature (paper)
		0	0	0	1	0	0	Enciphered PIN verification performed by ICC
		0	0	0	1	0	1	Enciphered PIN verification performed by ICC and signature (paper)
		0	Х	х	х	Х	х	Values in the range 000110-011101 reserved for future use by this specification
		0	1	1	1	1	0	Signature (paper)
		0	1	1	1	1	1	No CVM required
		1	0	х	Х	Х	Х	Values in the range 100000-101111 reserved for use by the individual payment systems
		1	1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Values in the range 110000-111110 reserved for use by the issuer
		1	1	1	1	1	1	This value is not available for use

Table 39: CVM Codes

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# CV Rule Byte 2 (Rightmost): Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) Condition Codes

Value	Meaning
'00'	Always
'01'	If unattended cash
'02'	If not unattended cash and not manual cash and not purchase with cashback
'03'	If terminal supports the CVM $^{20}$
'04'	If manual cash
'05'	If purchase with cashback
'06'	If transaction is in the application currency <sup>21</sup> and is under X value (see section 10.5 for a discussion of "X")
'07'	If transaction is in the application currency and is over X value
'08'	If transaction is in the application currency and is under Y value (see section 10.5 for a discussion of "Y")
'09'	If transaction is in the application currency and is over Y value
'0A' - '7F'	RFU
'80' - 'FF'	Reserved for use by individual payment systems

**Table 40: CVM Condition Codes** 

**Note:** For Condition Codes '01', '04', and '05', please refer to EMVCo General Bulletin No. 14 - Migration Schedule for New CVM Condition Codes.

 $<sup>^{20}</sup>$  Support for a CVM is described in EMV Book 4, Section 6.3.4 first paragraph..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> That is, Transaction Currency Code = Application Currency Code.

## C4 Issuer Code Table Index

Value	Refers to
'01'	Part 1 of ISO/IEC 8859
'02'	Part 2 of ISO/IEC 8859
'03'	Part 3 of ISO/IEC 8859
'04'	Part 4 of ISO/IEC 8859
'05'	Part 5 of ISO/IEC 8859
'06'	Part 6 of ISO/IEC 8859
'07'	Part 7 of ISO/IEC 8859
'08'	Part 8 of ISO/IEC 8859
'09'	Part 9 of ISO/IEC 8859
'10'	Part 10 of ISO/IEC 8859

**Table 41: Issuer Code Table Index** 

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# **C5** Terminal Verification Results

TVR Byte 1: (Leftmost)

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Offline data authentication was not performed
х	1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	SDA failed
х	X	1	Х	х	х	х	Х	ICC data missing
Х	Х	Х	1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Card appears on terminal exception file $^{22}$
х	х	х	Х	1	х	х	Х	DDA failed
х	х	х	Х	х	1	х	Х	CDA failed
х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	0	Х	RFU
х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	0	RFU

#### TVR Byte 2:

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	ICC and terminal have different application versions
х	1	х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Expired application
х	х	1	Х	Х	х	х	х	Application not yet effective
Х	Х	Х	1	Х	Х	Х	х	Requested service not allowed for card product
х	х	х	Х	1	х	х	х	New card
х	х	х	Х	Х	0	х	х	RFU
х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	0	Х	RFU
х	х	х	Х	х	х	х	0	RFU

**Table 42: Terminal Verification Results** 

 $<sup>^{22}</sup>$  There is no requirement in this specification for an exception file, but it is recognised that some terminals may have this capability.

#### TVR Byte 3:

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
1	х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	х	Cardholder verification was not successful
х	1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Unrecognised CVM
х	х	1	X	X	x	Х	Х	PIN Try Limit exceeded
Х	х	Х	1	Х	Х	Х	Х	PIN entry required and PIN pad not present or not working
Х	х	Х	Х	1	Х	Х	Х	PIN entry required, PIN pad present, but PIN was not entered
х	х	Х	Х	Х	1	Х	х	Online PIN entered
х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	0	х	RFU
х	х	х	Х	Х	х	х	0	RFU

#### TVR Byte 4:

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
1	Х	х	х	х	х	Х	Х	Transaction exceeds floor limit
х	1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Lower consecutive offline limit exceeded
Х	Х	1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Upper consecutive offline limit exceeded
Х	Х	Х	1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Transaction selected randomly for online processing
х	х	х	х	1	х	х	х	Merchant forced transaction online
х	х	х	Х	Х	0	х	х	RFU
х	х	х	Х	Х	Х	0	х	RFU
х	Х	х	Х	Х	Х	Х	0	RFU

Table 42: Terminal Verification Results, continued

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#### TVR Byte 5 (Rightmost):

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Default TDOL used
х	1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Issuer authentication failed
Х	X	1	Х	х	X	Х	X	Script processing failed before final GENERATE AC
Х	Х	Х	1	х	X	Х	X	Script processing failed after final GENERATE AC
х	Х	Х	Х	0	Х	Х	Х	RFU
х	Х	Х	Х	Х	0	Х	Х	RFU
х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	0	Х	RFU
х	Х	Х	х	х	Х	Х	0	RFU

Table 42: Terminal Verification Results, continued

# **C6** Transaction Status Information

#### TSI Byte 1 (Leftmost):

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Offline data authentication was performed
Х	1	Х	X	Х	X	Х	Х	Cardholder verification was performed
Х	х	1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Card risk management was performed
Х	х	Х	1	Х	Х	Х	Х	Issuer authentication was performed
Х	х	Х	Х	1	Х	Х	Х	Terminal risk management was performed
х	х	х	х	х	1	Х	х	Script processing was performed
х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	0	Х	RFU
х	х	х	Х	х	Х	х	0	RFU

#### TSI Byte 2 (Rightmost):

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
0	Х	х	х	х	Х	Х	х	RFU
х	0	х	Х	х	Х	х	х	RFU
х	Х	0	Х	х	Х	х	х	RFU
х	Х	х	0	х	Х	х	х	RFU
х	Х	х	Х	0	Х	Х	Х	RFU
х	Х	х	Х	х	0	х	х	RFU
х	Х	х	Х	Х	Х	0	Х	RFU
Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	0	RFU

**Table 43: Transaction Status Information** 

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# **Annex D** Transaction Log Information

# D1 Purpose

Provide support for accessing a transaction log file by special devices.

#### D2 Conditions of Execution

This optional function is intended to be executed by special devices.

# D3 Sequence of Execution

This function may be executed after Application Selection.

## **D4** Description

To get the Transaction Log information, the two following data elements are used: Log Entry and Log Format.

Table 44 describes the format of the Log Entry data element (tag '9F4D'):

Byte	Format	Length	Value
1	b	1	SFI containing the cyclic transaction log file
2	b	1	Maximum number of records in the transaction log file

Table 44: Log Entry

Devices that read the transaction log use the Log Entry data element to determine the location (SFI) and the maximum number of transaction log records.

The SFI shall be in the range 11 to 30.

The Transaction Log records shall be accessible using the READ RECORD command as specified in section 6.5.11. The file is a cyclic file as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4. Record #1 is the most recent transaction. Record #2 is the next prior transaction, etc.

The Transaction Log records shall not be designated in the Application File Locator. Each record is a concatenation of the values identified in the Log Format data element. The records in the file shall not contain the Application Elementary File (AEF) Data Template (tag '70').

The Log Format and the Transaction Log records shall remain accessible when the application is blocked.

To read the transaction log information, the special device uses the following steps:

- Perform Application Selection and retrieve the Log Entry data element located in the FCI Issuer Discretionary Data. If the Log Entry data element is not present, the application does not support the Transaction Log function.
- Issue a GET DATA command to retrieve the Log Format data element.
- Issue READ RECORD commands to read the Transaction Log records.

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## D5 Example

Note that the following data elements are shown for example purposes only.

A Log Entry data element equal to '0F14' indicates that the transaction log file is located in SFI 15 ('0F') and contains a maximum of 20 records ('14').

A Log Format data element equal to '9A039F21035F2A029F02069F4E149F3602' indicates that the transaction log records have the following content:

Data Content	Tag	Length
Transaction Date	'9A'	3
Transaction Time	'9F21'	3
Transaction Currency Code	'5F2A'	2
Amount, Authorised	'9F02'	6
Merchant Name and Location	'9F4E'	20
Application Transaction Counter	'9F36'	2

Table 45: Example of Log Format

In Table 45, lengths and tags are shown for clarity. They do not appear in the log record which is the concatenation of values (no TLV coding).

Data elements listed in the Log Format may come from the terminal and the card. Terminal data elements such as Merchant Name and Location might have been passed to the card in the PDOL or CDOL data.

# Annex E TVR and TSI Bit Settings Following Script Processing

Four possible scenarios can occur when processing a script. These scenarios are described below, together with the expected results in terms of the setting of the appropriate TVR bits, the TSI bit, and the Issuer Script Results.

In the following descriptions:

- "TVR bits" refers to TVR byte 5 bit 6 and bit 5 (depending on whether it is a tag '71' and/or tag '72' script) as defined in Table 42.
- "TSI bit" refers to TSI byte 1 bit 3 as defined in Table 43.

The Issuer Script Results are defined in Book 4, Annex A5.

#### E1 Scenarios

#### Scenario 1

A script is received, it parses correctly, the commands are sent to the card, and the card returns '9000', '62xx', or '63xx' to all commands received.

In this scenario the terminal:

- shall set the TSI bit
- shall not set the TVR bits
- shall set the first byte of the Issuer Script Results to '2x', 'Script processing successful'.

#### Scenario 2

A script is received, it parses correctly, the commands are sent to the card, but the card does not return '9000', '62xx', or '63xx' to one of the commands received.

In this scenario the terminal:

- shall set the TSI bit
- shall set the appropriate TVR bit(s)
- shall set the first byte of the Issuer Script Results to '1x', 'Script processing failed'
- shall send no further commands from that script to the card, even if they exist.

#### Scenario 3

A script is received, it does not parse correctly, and so no commands are sent to the card.

In this scenario the terminal:

- shall set the TSI bit
- shall set the appropriate TVR bit(s)
- shall set the first byte of the Issuer Script Results to '00', 'Script not performed'.

#### Scenario 4

No script is received. In this scenario the terminal shall set neither the TSI bit nor the TVR bit(s).

In this event there will be no Issuer Script Results.

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#### **E2** Additional Information

It is possible, but not recommended, that commands may be sent to the card 'on the fly' as a script is parsed. In this event:

- If a parsing error occurs before any commands are sent to the card, the terminal shall set the first byte of the Issuer Script Results to '00' and shall set the appropriate TVR bits and the TSI bit.
- If a parsing error occurs after any command has been sent to the card, the terminal shall set the first byte of the Issuer Script Results to '1x', and shall set the appropriate TVR bits and the TSI bit.

If more than one script is received, the terminal:

- shall set the TSI bit
- shall set the TVR bit(s) (as described in Scenarios 2 and 3) if any error occurs
- shall set the Issuer Script Results as described in Scenarios 1 through 3 for each script on a script-by-script basis
- shall process all Issuer scripts

# Annex F Status Words Returned in EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE

The terminal shall issue an EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command to the card only if the card indicates in byte 1 bit 3 of the AIP that it supports issuer authentication using the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.

The terminal shall issue only one EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command to the card during a transaction. As stated in section 10.9, there is a complementary card requirement to this which states that the card shall return status '6985', 'Command Not Supported', to the second and any subsequent EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE commands received during the transaction.

Table 46 explains various status values the terminal may receive in response to the (first) EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command issued to the card, and the action the terminal shall take as a result.

Status	Explanation	Terminal Action
'9000'	Issuer authentication was successful.	The terminal shall continue with the transaction.
'6300' or any other status except '6985' and '9000'	Issuer authentication failed.	The terminal shall set the 'Issuer authentication failed' bit in the TVR to 1, and continue with the transaction.
'6985'	Issuer authentication failed and the card is in an error state (it has indicated in the AIP that it supports EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE, but in the status returned that it does not).	This condition should never occur; in the event that it does, the behaviour of the terminal is indeterminate and it shall either terminate the transaction OR set the 'Issuer authentication failed' bit in the TVR to 1, and continue with the transaction.

Table 46: Terminal Action after (First) EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Response

# Annex G Account Type

Value	Account Type
00	Default - unspecified
10	Savings
20	Cheque/debit
30	Credit
All other values RFU	

**Table 47: Account Type** 

# Part V Common Core Definitions

# Introduction

This Part describes an optional extension to this Book, to be used when implementing the Common Core Definitions (CCD).

These Common Core Definitions specify a minimum common set of card application implementation options, card application behaviours, and data element definitions sufficient to accomplish an EMV transaction. Terminals certified to be compliant with the existing EMV Specifications will, without change, accept cards implemented according to the Common Core Definitions, since the Common Core Definitions are supported within the existing EMV requirements.

To be compliant with the Common Core Definitions, an implementation shall implement all the additional requirements in the Common Core Definitions Parts of all affected Books.

# **Changed and Added Sections**

Each section heading below refers to the section in this Book to which the additional requirements apply, or introduces new sections where required. The text defines requirements for a common core implementation, in addition to the requirements already specified in the referenced section of EMV.

#### Part II - Data Elements and Commands

#### 6 Commands for Financial Transaction

#### 6.2 Response APDU Format

For the following commands used during transaction processing, the body of the response APDU is a constructed data object with tag equal to '77' of which the value field may contain one or more BER-TLV coded data objects.

- GENERATE AC
- GET PROCESSING OPTIONS
- INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE

Tag	Value
'77'	Response Message Template Format 2

Table CCD 1: Body of Response APDU Structure

#### 6.5 Commands

#### 6.5.4 EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.4.1 Definition and Scope

The CCD-compliant application shall support issuer authentication using the second GENERATE AC command. The CCD-compliant application shall indicate that the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command is not supported in EMV applications by setting bit 3 in byte 1 of the AIP to 0.

# 6.5.5 GENERATE APPLICATION CRYPTOGRAM Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.5.1 Definition and Scope

The CCD-compliant application shall support issuer authentication using the second GENERATE AC command.

#### 6.5.5.3 Data Field Sent in the Command Message

CDOL2 shall include tag '8A' (Authorisation Response Code) and tag '91' (Issuer Authentication Data).

#### 6.5.5.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message

The response message shall be a BER-TLV coded constructed data object introduced by tag '77' and contains only the data shown in Table CCD 2.

Tag	Value			
'9F27'	Cryptogram Information Data			
'9F36'	Application Transaction Counter			
'9F26'	Application Cryptogram			
'9F10'	Issuer Application Data			

Table CCD 2: Format 2 GENERATE AC Response Message Data Field

The required data elements for the response returned in an envelope as specified for the CDA feature (described in section 6.6 of Book 2) are shown in Book 2 Table CCD 1 and Table CCD 2.

The Cryptogram Information Data returned in the GENERATE AC response message is coded according to Table CCD 3:

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning	
0	0							AAC	
0	1							TC	
1	0							ARQC	
1	1							RFU	
		0	0					Payment System-specific cryptogram	
				0				No advice required	
					0	0	0	No information given	

**Table CCD 3: Coding of Cryptogram Information Data** 

#### 6.5.8 GET PROCESSING OPTIONS Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.8.2 Command Message

The CCD-compliant application shall not preclude support for PDOL.

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#### 6.5.8.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message

The response message shall be a BER-TLV coded constructed data object introduced by tag '77' and contains only the data shown in Table CCD 4.

Tag	Value			
'82'	Application Interchange Profile			
'94'	Application File Locator			

Table CCD 4: Format 2 GET PROCESSING OPTIONS Response Message Data Field

#### 6.5.9 INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Command-Response APDUs

#### 6.5.9.4 Data Field Returned in the Response Message

The response message shall be a BER-TLV coded constructed data object introduced by tag '77' and contains only the data shown in Table  $\rm CCD$  5.

Tag	Value				
'9F4B'	Signed Dynamic Application Data				

Table CCD 5: Format 2 Internal Authenticate Response Message Data Field

#### 6.5.12.2 Command Message

To allow an issuer to use offline plaintext PIN verification as a possible CVM, a CCD-compliant card shall support the VERIFY command with parameter P2 = '80' as defined in Book 3, Table 23.

# Part III - Debit and Credit Application Specification

# 7 Files for Financial Transaction Interchange

#### 7.3 Data Retrievable by GET DATA Command

The ICC shall support the GET DATA command for retrieval of the primitive data object with tag  $^{9}F17^{\circ}$  (PIN Try Counter).

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## 9 GENERATE AC Command Coding

#### 9.2 Command Data

#### 9.2.2 Transaction Certificate Data

The CCD-compliant application shall not contain a TDOL. The CCD-compliant application shall not request the terminal to generate a TC Hash Value (that is, tag '98' shall not be included in CDOL1 or CDOL2).

#### The following Section 9.2.3 applies to a CCD-compliant application.

#### 9.2.3 Common Core Definitions Card Verification Results

In response to the GENERATE AC command and as part of the Issuer Application Data, the CCD-compliant application shall return the Card Verification Results (CVR). The CVR includes information for the issuer regarding the results of Card Risk Management processing and application processing. The format of the CVR for a CCD-compliant application is specified in CCD Annex C7.3.

#### 9.2.3.1 Options Related to Setting/Resetting of Counters and Indicators

The issuer shall have the option of specifying whether a new card is required to set the 'Go Online on Next Transaction Was Set' bit.

The issuer shall have the option of specifying whether the CCD-compliant application requires issuer authentication to be performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction.

The issuer shall have the option of specifying whether the CCD-compliant application requires issuer authentication to pass when performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction.

If the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to be performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction, the issuer shall have the option of specifying whether the CCD-compliant application requires issuer authentication to pass for resetting all the following non-velocity-checking indicators:

- Issuer Authentication Failed
- Last Online Transaction Not Completed
- Issuer Script Processing Failed
- Go Online on Next Transaction Was Set

If the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass when performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction, the issuer shall have the option of specifying whether the CCD-compliant application requires issuer authentication to pass for resetting all the following non-velocity checking indicators:

- Last Online Transaction Not Completed
- Issuer Script Processing Failed
- Go Online on Next Transaction Was Set

If the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to be performed or does not require issuer authentication to pass when performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction, the issuer shall have the option of specifying whether the CCD-compliant application requires issuer authentication to pass for resetting the velocity-checking offline transaction count(s) and cumulative amount(s).

The issuer shall have the option of indicating whether the application shall use the 'Update Counters' bits in the CSU to update the velocity-checking count(s) and cumulative amount(s) associated with the offline transaction limits referred to in bits b8 - b5 of byte 3 of the CVR, if the 'CSU Created by Proxy for the Issuer' bit in the CSU is set to 1.

If the 'CSU Created by Proxy for the Issuer' bit is set to 1 in the CSU, and if the issuer specifies that 'Update Counters' shall not be used, then the issuer shall have the option of indicating whether the application:

- shall not update the offline counters
- shall set the offline counters to zero
- shall set the offline counters to the upper offline limits
- shall add the transaction to the offline counter(s)

#### 9.2.3.2 Setting and Resetting of Bits in the CVR

The following describes the conditions under which each bit in the CVR of a Common Core Definitions card is set or reset.

#### Application Cryptogram Type Returned in Second GENERATE AC

In the first GENERATE AC response, these bits shall be set to Second GENERATE AC Not Requested.

In the second GENERATE AC response, these bits shall be set to the value of bits b8 – b7 of the Cryptogram Information Data returned in the response to the second GENERATE AC command of the current transaction (AAC or TC).

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#### Application Cryptogram Type Returned in First GENERATE AC

In both the first and second GENERATE AC response, these bits shall be set to the value of bits b8 – b7 of the Cryptogram Information Data returned in the response to the first GENERATE AC command of the current transaction (AAC, TC, or ARQC).

#### **CDA Performed**

In the first GENERATE AC response, this bit shall be set if and only if Signed Dynamic Data is returned in the response to the first GENERATE AC command of the current transaction.

In the second GENERATE AC response, this bit shall be set if and only if Signed Dynamic Data is returned in the response to the first or second GENERATE AC command (or both) of the current transaction.

#### **Offline DDA Performed**

In both the first and second GENERATE AC response, this bit shall be set if and only if Signed Dynamic Application Data is returned in the response to the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command of the current transaction.

#### **Issuer Authentication Not Performed**

In the second GENERATE AC response, this bit shall be set if and only if the CCD-compliant application did not receive Issuer Authentication Data. This may be the case either if the transaction was unable to go online or if the issuer did not provide Issuer Authentication Data in the response message.

In the first GENERATE AC response, this bit shall be set to the value it had in the most recent second GENERATE AC response sent by the CCD-compliant application.

#### **Issuer Authentication Failed**

This bit shall be set in the GENERATE AC response if and only if issuer authentication was performed and failed. In the first GENERATE AC response, it indicates issuer authentication failed in a previous online transaction. In the second GENERATE AC response, it indicates either that issuer authentication failed in the current transaction, or that issuer authentication failed in a previous transaction and the bit was not reset.

Once set, this bit shall remain set until either:

- issuer authentication is successful,
- or all of the following conditions are true:
  - the transaction successfully went online (that is, the Authorisation Response Code does not indicate that the terminal was unable to go online),
  - issuer authentication was not performed,
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to be performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction, and
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass for resetting of non-velocity-checking indicators.

#### **Low Order Nibble of PIN Try Counter**

In both the first and second GENERATE AC response, these bits shall be set to the value of the low-order nibble (bits b4-b1) of the PIN Try Counter.

#### Offline PIN Verification Performed

In both the first and second GENERATE AC response, this bit shall be set if and only if Offline PIN Verification has been performed (successfully or unsuccessfully) on the current transaction.

#### Offline PIN Verification Performed and PIN Not Successfully Verified

In both the first and second GENERATE AC response, this bit shall be set if and only if Offline PIN Verification has been performed on the current transaction and the PIN was not successfully verified during processing of the current transaction.

#### **PIN Try Limit Exceeded**

In both the first and second GENERATE AC response, this bit shall be set if and only if the PIN Try Counter is zero.

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#### **Last Online Transaction Not Completed**

This bit shall be set in the first GENERATE AC response if and only if in the previous transaction, the CCD-compliant application requested to go online and the transaction was not completed (that is, the second GENERATE AC command was not received).

Once set, this bit shall remain set until either:

- issuer authentication is successful,
- or all of the following conditions are true:
  - the transaction successfully went online (that is, the Authorisation Response Code does not indicate that the terminal was unable to go online),
  - issuer authentication was not performed,
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to be performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction, and
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass for resetting of non-velocity-checking indicators.
- or all of the following conditions are true:
  - the transaction successfully went online (that is, the Authorisation Response Code does not indicate that the terminal was unable to go online),
  - issuer authentication was performed and failed,
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass when performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction, and
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass for resetting of non-velocity-checking indicators.

#### Lower Offline Transaction Count Limit Exceeded

In both the first and second GENERATE AC response, this bit shall be set if the CCD-compliant application has exceeded an issuer-specified lower limit for the number of transactions approved offline. This bit may represent the condition of multiple counters. At the least, all transactions approved offline whose amounts were not cumulated shall be included in at least one transaction count. This bit may also be set under additional conditions specified by the issuer.

#### **Upper Offline Transaction Count Limit Exceeded**

In both the first and second GENERATE AC response, this bit shall be set if the CCD-compliant application has exceeded an issuer-specified upper limit for the number of transactions approved offline. This bit may represent the condition of multiple counters. At the least, all transactions approved offline whose amounts were not cumulated shall be included in at least one transaction count. This bit may also be set under additional conditions specified by the issuer.

#### Lower Cumulative Offline Amount Limit Exceeded

In both the first and second GENERATE AC response, this bit shall be set if the CCD-compliant application has exceeded an issuer-specified lower limit for cumulative amounts approved offline. This bit may represent the condition of multiple counters. At the least, all domestic transactions approved offline shall be included in at least one cumulative amount. This bit may also be set under additional conditions specified by the issuer.

#### **Upper Cumulative Offline Amount Limit Exceeded**

In both the first and second GENERATE AC response, this bit shall be set if the CCD-compliant application has exceeded an issuer-specified upper limit for cumulative amounts approved offline. This bit may represent the condition of multiple counters. At the least, all domestic transactions approved offline shall be included in at least one cumulative amount. This bit may also be set under additional conditions specified by the issuer.

#### Issuer-discretionary bit 1 – Issuer-discretionary bit 4:

These bits are set in the first and second GENERATE AC response at the discretion of the issuer. The meaning of these bits is defined by the issuer and is outside the scope of this specification.

# Number of Successfully Processed Issuer Script Commands Containing Secure Messaging

In the first and second GENERATE AC response, these bits shall be set to the number of commands successfully processed with secure messaging.

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#### **Issuer Script Processing Failed**

In both the first and second GENERATE AC response, this bit shall be set if and only if processing of a command with secure messaging failed.

Once set, this bit shall remain set until a subsequent GENERATE AC command where either:

- issuer authentication is successful.
- or all of the following conditions are true:
  - the transaction successfully went online (that is, the Authorisation Response Code does not indicate that the terminal was unable to go online),
  - issuer authentication was not performed
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to be performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction, and
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass for resetting of non-velocity-checking indicators.
- or all of the following conditions are true:
  - the transaction successfully went online (that is, the Authorisation Response Code does not indicate that the terminal was unable to go online),
  - issuer authentication was performed and failed,
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass when performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction, and
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass for resetting of non-velocity-checking indicators.

#### Offline Data Authentication Failed on Previous Transaction

In both the first and second GENERATE AC response, this bit shall be set if and only if, in the TVR returned during the previous transaction, any of the following bits was set:

- SDA Failed
- DDA Failed
- CDA Failed

Once set, this bit shall remain set until a subsequent transaction is performed that meets either of the following conditions:

- the previous transaction successfully went online, or
- the previous transaction was approved offline.

If either condition is met the bit is reset in the first GENERATE AC response.

#### Go Online on Next Transaction Was Set

In both the first and second GENERATE AC response, this bit shall be set if and only if the 'Set Go Online on Next Transaction' bit of the last successfully recovered CSU was set, or it is a new card and the issuer has specified that a new card is required to set the 'Go Online on Next Transaction Was Set' bit.

Once set, this bit shall remain set until a subsequent GENERATE AC command where either:

- all of the following conditions are true:
  - issuer authentication is successful, and
  - the Set Go Online on Next Transaction bit of the CSU is not set.
- or all of the following conditions are true:
  - the transaction successfully went online (that is, the Authorisation Response Code does not indicate that the terminal was unable to go online),
  - issuer authentication was not performed,
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to be performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction, and
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass for resetting of non-velocity-checking indicators.
- or all of the following conditions are true:
  - the transaction successfully went online (that is, the Authorisation Response Code does not indicate that the terminal was unable to go online),
  - issuer authentication was performed and failed,
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass when performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction, and
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication for resetting of non-velocity-checking indicators.

#### Unable to go Online

This bit shall be set in the second GENERATE AC response if and only if the Authorization Response Code, tag '8A', returned from the terminal indicates the terminal was unable to go online (set to 'Y3' or 'Z3').

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#### 9.2.3.3 Mandatory Actions Due to CVR Bit Settings

This section provides a list of mandatory actions that shall be taken by the CCD-compliant application, and issuer-configurable options that shall be supported by the CCD-compliant application.

#### **Issuer Authentication Not Performed**

The issuer shall have the option of specifying that if this bit is set, whether the CCD-compliant application shall:

- force transactions at online-capable terminals to go online,
- or allow the transaction to remain offline.

The issuer shall have the option of specifying that if this bit is set, and either the transaction occurs at an offline-only terminal or the terminal is unable to go online, whether the CCD-compliant application shall:

- be allowed to approve (TC) the transaction, or
- decline the transaction.

#### **Issuer Authentication Failed**

The issuer shall have the option of specifying that if this bit is set, whether the CCD-compliant application shall:

- force transactions at online-capable terminals to go online,
- or allow the transaction to remain offline.

The issuer shall have the option of specifying that if this bit is set, and either the transaction occurs at an offline-only terminal or the terminal is unable to go online, whether the CCD-compliant application shall:

- be allowed to approve (TC) the transaction, or
- decline the transaction.

#### **PIN Try Limit Exceeded**

The issuer shall have the option of specifying that if this bit is set, the CCD-compliant application shall decline the transaction offline.

The issuer shall have the option of specifying that if this bit is set, whether the CCD-compliant application shall:

- force transactions at online-capable terminals to go online,
- or allow the transaction to remain offline.

The issuer shall have the option of specifying that if this bit is set, and either the transaction occurs at an offline-only terminal or the terminal is unable to go online, whether the CCD-compliant application shall:

- be allowed to approve (TC) the transaction, or
- decline the transaction.

The ICC shall not block the application or the card due to this bit being set.

#### **Last Online Transaction Not Completed**

If this bit is set, the CCD-compliant application shall force the transaction at online-capable terminals to go online.

The issuer shall have the option of specifying that if this bit is set, and either the transaction occurs at an offline-only terminal or the terminal is unable to go online, whether the CCD-compliant application shall:

- be allowed to approve (TC) the transaction, or
- decline the transaction.

#### Lower Offline Transaction Count Limit Exceeded

If this bit is set in the first GENERATE AC response, the CCD-compliant application shall force the transaction at online-capable terminals to go online.

#### **Upper Offline Transaction Count Limit Exceeded**

If this bit is set and either the transaction occurs at an offline-only terminal or the terminal is unable to go online, the CCD-compliant application shall decline the transaction. However, the issuer shall have the option of allowing the CCD-compliant application to override this decline for a transaction at Terminal Type 26.

#### Lower Cumulative Offline Amount Limit Exceeded

If this bit is set in the first GENERATE AC response, the CCD-compliant application shall force the transaction at online-capable terminals to go online.

#### Upper Cumulative Offline Amount Limit Exceeded

If this bit is set and either the transaction occurs at an offline-only terminal or the terminal is unable to go online, the CCD-compliant application shall decline the transaction. However, the issuer shall have the option of allowing the CCD-compliant application to override this decline for a transaction at Terminal Type 26.

#### **Issuer Script Processing Failed**

The issuer shall have the option of specifying that if this bit is set, whether the CCD-compliant application shall:

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- force transactions at online-capable terminals to go online,
- or allow the transaction to remain offline.

#### Go Online on Next Transaction Was Set

The issuer shall have the option of specifying that if this bit is set, and either the transaction occurs at an offline-only terminal or the terminal is unable to go online, whether the CCD-compliant application shall:

- be allowed to approve (TC) the transaction, or
- decline the transaction.

#### 9.3 Command Use

The CCD-compliant application shall respond to the first GENERATE AC with any of the following cryptogram types:

- TC
- ARQC
- AAC

The CCD-compliant application shall respond to the second GENERATE AC (if applicable) with either of the following cryptogram types:

- TC
- AAC

# 10 Functions Used in Transaction Processing

#### 10.5 Cardholder Verification

The CCD-compliant application shall support Cardholder Verification. It shall indicate this by setting the Application Interchange Profile byte 1, bit 5 to 1.

#### 10.5.1 Offline PIN Processing

The CCD-compliant application shall be capable of supporting offline plaintext PIN verification. It is the issuer's option whether or not to use offline plaintext PIN as a cardholder verification method.

#### 10.8 Card Action Analysis

The CCD-compliant application shall not request that the terminal send an advice message to the issuer.

#### 10.8.1 Terminal Messages for an AAC

The CCD-compliant application shall set bits b3-b1 of the CID to '000' in the GENERATE AC command response.

#### 10.8.2 Advice Messages

The CCD-compliant application shall not request the terminal to send an advice message. Bit b4 of the Cryptogram Information Data shall be set to 0.

### 10.10 Issuer-to-Card Script Processing

An issuer shall send no more than one issuer script template in an authorization response message. The script template may contain multiple commands. The script template may be tag '71' or tag '72'.

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#### 10.11 Completion

#### The following Section 10.11.1 applies to a CCD-compliant application.

#### 10.11.1 Additional Completion Actions for a CCD-Compliant Application

# 10.11.1.1 Actions Taken by CCD-compliant Application After Issuer Authentication is Successful

After issuer authentication is successful, if the 'CSU Created by Proxy for the Issuer' bit in the CSU is set to 1, and if the issuer specifies that 'Update Counters' shall not be used, then the following shall govern the behaviour of velocity-checking counters and cumulative amounts associated with the offline transaction limits referred to in bits b8-b5 of byte 3 of the CVR:

- If the issuer specifies that the application shall not update the offline counters, no offline counter or cumulative amount is modified.
- If the issuer specifies that the application shall set the offline counters to zero, the application will reset all the offline counters and cumulative amounts to zero. By doing so, the issuer allows the application to accept offline transactions, up to the offline limits.
- If the issuer specifies that the application shall set the offline counters to the upper offline limits, the offline counters and cumulative amounts will be set to their respective upper limits.
- If the issuer specifies that the application shall add the transaction to the offline counter(s), the transaction will be included in the offline counters or cumulative amounts as if it were an offline transaction.

This section describes the actions to be taken by the CCD-compliant application due to the setting of each bit in the CSU after issuer authentication is successful..

#### **Issuer Approves Online Transaction**

If 'Issuer Approves Online Transaction' is set and the terminal requests a TC, the application shall approve the transaction by returning a TC.

If 'Issuer Approves Online Transaction' is not set, the application shall decline the transaction by returning an AAC.

#### **Card Block**

If 'Card Block' is set, all applications in the ICC shall be permanently disabled, including applications that may be selected implicitly. For all subsequent SELECT commands the card shall return the status bytes 'Function not supported' (SW1-SW2 = '6A81') and perform no other action.

#### **Application Block**

If 'Application Block' is set, the currently selected application shall be invalidated. An invalidated application shall return the status bytes 'Selected file invalidated' (SW1-SW2 = '6283') in response to a SELECT command and return only an AAC in response to the GENERATE AC command.

#### **Update PIN Try Counter**

If 'Update PIN Try Counter' is set, the application shall update the PIN Try Counter (PTC) with the value contained in bits b4-b1 of byte 1 of the CSU. If the PIN is blocked, updating the value of the PTC with a non-zero value unblocks the PIN. Updating the value of the PTC with a zero value blocks the PIN.

If 'Update PIN Try Counter' is not set, no update of the PTC shall be performed by the application.

The value contained in bits b4-b1 of byte 1 of the CSU shall never be interpreted by the application.

#### **Set Go Online on Next Transaction**

If 'Set Go Online on Next Transaction' is set, the application shall force subsequent transactions at online-capable terminals to go online (that is, the CCD-compliant application shall return an ARQC in response to the first GENERATE AC command if a TC or an ARQC is requested). The application shall continue to try to go online at online-cable terminals until a subsequent GENERATE AC command where either:

- all of the following conditions are true:
  - issuer authentication is successful, and
  - the Set Go Online on Next Transaction bit of the CSU is not set.
- or all of the following conditions are true:
  - the transaction successfully went online (that is, the Authorisation Response Code does not indicate that the terminal was unable to go online),
  - issuer authentication was not performed,
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to be performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction, and
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass for resetting of non-velocity-checking indicators."
- or all of the following conditions are true:
  - the transaction successfully went online (that is, the Authorisation Response Code does not indicate that the terminal was unable to go online),

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- issuer authentication was performed and failed,
- the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass when performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction, and
- the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass for resetting of non-velocity-checking indicators.

#### **Update Counters**

'Update Counters' (bits b2-b1 of byte 2 of the CSU) govern the behaviour of velocity-checking counters and cumulative amounts associated with the offline transaction limits referred to in bits b8-b5 of byte 3 of the CVR if either of the following is true:

- the 'CSU Created by Proxy for the Issuer' bit in the CSU is set to 0
- the issuer specifies that the application shall use the 'Update Counters' bits in the CSU to update the velocity-checking count(s) and cumulative amount(s) regardless of the bit setting for 'CSU Created by Proxy for the Issuer'

If 'Update Counters' is set to 'Do Not Update Offline Counters', no offline counter or cumulative amount shall be modified.

If 'Update Counters' is set to 'Reset Offline Counters to Zero', the application shall reset all the offline counters and cumulative amounts to zero. By doing so, the issuer allows the application to accept offline transactions, up to the offline limits.

If 'Update Counters' is set to 'Set Offline Counters to Upper Offline Limits', the application shall set the offline counters and cumulative amounts to their respective upper limits.

If 'Update Counters' is set to 'Add Transaction to Offline Counters', the application shall include the transaction in the offline counters or cumulative amounts as if it were an offline transaction.

#### 10.11.1.2 Other Completion Actions

After the transaction successfully went online (that is, the Authorisation Response Code does not indicate that the terminal was unable to go online), the CCD-compliant application shall reset to zero the velocity-checking offline transaction count(s) and cumulative offline amount(s) if either of the following are true:

- all of the following conditions are true:
  - the terminal requested a TC,
  - issuer authentication was not performed,

- the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to be performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction, and
- the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass for resetting of velocity-checking counters.
- or all of the following conditions are true:
  - the terminal requested a TC,
  - issuer authentication was performed and failed,
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass when performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction, and
  - the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass for resetting of velocity-checking counters.

After the transaction successfully went online (that is, the Authorisation Response Code does not indicate that the terminal was unable to go online), the CCD-compliant application shall approve the transaction if all of the following conditions are true:

- the terminal requested a TC, and
- one of the following is true:
  - issuer authentication is successful and the 'Issuer Approves Online Transaction bit' of the recovered CSU is set to 1, or
  - issuer authentication was not performed and the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to be performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction, or
  - issuer authentication was performed and failed and the CCD-compliant application does not require issuer authentication to pass when performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction.

After the transaction successfully went online (that is, the Authorisation Response Code does not indicate that the terminal was unable to go online), the CCD-compliant application shall decline the transaction in the second GENERATE AC response if either of the following conditions are true:

- both of the following are true:
  - issuer authentication was not performed, and
  - the CCD-compliant application requires issuer authentication to be performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction,
- or both of the following are true:
  - issuer authentication was performed and failed, and

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• the CCD-compliant application requires issuer authentication to pass when performed for the application to approve (TC) an online transaction.

After the transaction did not successfully complete online (that is the Authorisation Response Code indicates that the terminal was unable to go online), the CCD-compliant application shall decide whether to approve or decline the transaction.

### Part IV - Annexes

## **Annex A Data Elements Dictionary**

For the data elements shown in Table CCD 6:

- If the source is 'Terminal', the data element shall not be included in any DOL used by a CCD-compliant application.
- If the source is 'ICC', the data element shall not be identified in the AFL of a CCD-compliant application.

Data Element Name	Tag	Source
Amount, Reference Currency	'9F3A'	Terminal
Application Reference Currency	'9F3B'	ICC
Application Reference Currency Exponent	'9F43'	ICC
Default Dynamic Data Authentication Data Object List (DDOL)	—	Terminal
Transaction Certificate (TC) Hash Value	'98'	Terminal

Table CCD 6: Data Elements Not Used by a CCD-Compliant Application

Table CCD 7 lists data elements (in addition to those defined in Annex A) that are defined within the context of the Common Core Definitions.

Name	Description	Source	Format	Templat e	T a g	Leng th
Card Verification Results (CVR)	Contains data sent to the issuer indicating exception conditions that occurred during the current and previous transactions. Transmitted to the terminal in Issuer Application Data as specified in Table CCD 9.	ICC	b			5
Common Core Identifier (CCI)	Data sent to the issuer identifying the format of the Issuer Application Data and the method for calculating the Application Cryptogram. Transmitted to the terminal in Issuer Application Data as specified in Table CCD 9. Contains the following: Format Code (FC) Cryptogram Version (CV)	ICC	b			1
Derivation Key Index (DKI)	Data sent to the issuer identifying the issuer's derivation key for deriving the card's ICC Master Keys. Transmitted to the terminal in Issuer Application Data as specified in Table CCD 9.	ICC	b			1
Issuer Discretionary Data	Contains issuer proprietary application data for transmission to the issuer in an online transaction. Transmitted to the terminal in Issuer Application Data as specified in Table CCD 9.	ICC	b			15

Table CCD 7: Additional Data Elements Defined for CCD

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## Annex C Coding of Data Elements Used in Transaction Processing

Please add the following sections after Annex C.6.

### C7 Issuer Application Data for a Common Core Definitions-Compliant Application

The CCD-compliant application shall have an Issuer Application Data (IAD) field of fixed length, 32 bytes long, with the following attributes:

- Byte 1 shall be set to '0F'.
- Byte 2 shall be the Common Core Identifier (CCI).
- Byte 17 shall be set to '0F'.

The CCD-compliant application shall support the selection of different Issuer Application Data if:

- the card requests the Terminal Type and the Additional Terminal Capabilities in PDOL, and
- the values provided by the terminal in the PDOL related data for the Terminal Type and the first two bytes of the Additional Terminal Capabilities are '34' and '0000' respectively.

#### C7.1 Common Core Identifier

The CCI shall identify the format of the IAD, and the Cryptogram Version (CV). Values in the range '00' to '9F' are reserved to avoid conflict with legacy Cryptogram Version Numbers.

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
Х	Х	х	х					Common Core IAD Format Code (FC).
1	0	1	0					CCD Version 4.1 IAD Format (='A')
				Х	Х	Х	х	Common Core Cryptogram Version (CV)
				0	1	0	1	CCD Version 4.1 Cryptogram Version (= '5' for Triple DES)
				0	1	1	0	CCD Version 4.1 Cryptogram Version (= '6' for AES)

**Table CCD 8: Common Core Identifier** 

Bits b8 - b5 of the CCI shall indicate the Format Code (FC). Values in the range 'A' - 'F' shall indicate a CCD-specified IAD format (all values RFU by EMVCo for CCD).

Bits b4 - b1 of the CCI shall indicate the Cryptogram Version (CV) for the Application Cryptogram. The CV indicates:

- The cryptogram input data and key derivation method the CCD-compliant application uses to generate the Application Cryptogram.
- The cryptogram input data (including CSU coding), key derivation method, and ARPC method the CCD-compliant application expects the issuer to use when generating the Authorisation Response Cryptogram.

Values in the range '4' - 'F' shall indicate a CCD-specified cryptogram algorithm and data set (all values RFU by EMVCo for CCD). Values in the range '0' - '3' shall indicate a proprietary cryptogram algorithm. When using the CV range '0' - '3', applications are not CCD-compliant.

### C7.2 Issuer Application Data for Format Code 'A'

The format and coding of the IAD with a Format Code of 'A' shall be as shown in Table CCD 9:

Byte(s)	Contents	Description
1	Length Indicator	Length of EMVCo-defined data in IAD. Set to '0F'.
2	CCI	Common Core Identifier
3	DKI	Derivation Key Index
4-8	CVR	Card Verification Results (see section C7.3)
9-16	Counters	Contents are at the discretion of the Payment System.
17	Length Indicator	Length of Issuer Discretionary Data field in IAD. Set to '0F'.
18-32	Issuer Discretionary Data	Contents are at the discretion of the issuer.

Table CCD 9: Issuer Application Data for Format Code 'A'

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### **C7.3 Card Verification Results**

The coding of the CVR for a Common Core IAD Format Code of value 'A' shall be as shown in Table CCD 10.

#### CVR Byte 1

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
х	х							Application Cryptogram Type Returned in Second GENERATE AC
0	0							AAC
0	1							TC
1	0							Second GENERATE AC Not Requested
1	1							RFU
		х	х					Application Cryptogram Type Returned in First GENERATE AC
		0	0					AAC
		0	1					TC
		1	0					ARQC
		1	1					RFU
				1				CDA Performed
					1			Offline DDA Performed
						1		Issuer Authentication Not Performed
							1	Issuer Authentication Failed

### CVR Byte 2

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
Х	Х	Х	Х					Low Order Nibble of PIN Try Counter
				1				Offline PIN Verification Performed
					1			Offline PIN Verification Performed and PIN Not Successfully Verified
						1		PIN Try Limit Exceeded
							1	Last Online Transaction Not Completed

Table CCD 10: Card Verification Results for Format Code 'A'

### CVR Byte 3

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
1								Lower Offline Transaction Count Limit Exceeded
	1							Upper Offline Transaction Count Limit Exceeded
		1						Lower Cumulative Offline Amount Limit Exceeded
			1					Upper Cumulative Offline Amount Limit Exceeded
				1				Issuer-discretionary bit 1
					1			Issuer-discretionary bit 2
						1		Issuer-discretionary bit 3
							1	Issuer-discretionary bit 4

### CVR Byte 4

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
х	х	х	X					Number of Successfully Processed Issuer Script Commands Containing Secure Messaging
				1				Issuer Script Processing Failed
					1			Offline Data Authentication Failed on Previous Transaction
						1		Go Online on Next Transaction Was Set
							1	Unable to go Online

### CVR Byte 5

	b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
Ī	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	RFU

Table CCD 10: Card Verification Results for Format Code 'A', continued

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
### C8 Card Status Update for a Common Core Definitions-Compliant Application

The Issuer Authentication Data shall include a Card Status Update (CSU) of fixed length, 4 bytes long. The coding of the CSU is shown in Table CCD 11.

#### CSU Byte 1

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
1		-			-			Proprietary Authentication Data Included
	0	0	0					RFU
				Х	Х	Х	Х	PIN Try Counter

### CSU Byte 2



**Note**: The 'CSU Created by Proxy for the Issuer' bit shall be set in the CSU if and only if the CSU is generated by a proxy for the Issuer.

Table CCD 11: Card Status Update for Cryptogram Versions '5' and '6'

### CSU Byte 3

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	RFU

### CSU Byte 4

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	Meaning
Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Issuer-Discretionary

Table CCD 11: Card Status Update for Cryptogram Versions '5' and '6', continued

The default value for issuer-discretionary data in the CSU is zero.

# **Annex D** Transaction Log Information

If the CCD-compliant application supports transaction logging, it shall be supported using the method specified in Annex D.

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